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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

PATRICK KALLAUS, Derivatively on
Behalf of HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC
INDUSTRIES, INC.
AND HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC
COMPANY, INC,

Plaintiff,

v.

TIMOTHY E. JOHNS, JAMES A.
AJELLO, SCOTT W. H. SEU,
THOMAS B. FARGO, CELESTE A.
CONNORS, ELISIA K. FLORES,
PEGGY Y. FOWLER, MICAH A.
KANE, YOKO OTANI, RICHARD J.
DAHL, KEITH P. RUSSELL,
MICHAEL J. KENNEDY, WILLIAM
JAMES SCILACCI, JR., MARY E.
KIPP, ALANA K. PAKKALA,
TOBY B. TANIGUCHI, KEVIN M.
BURKE, EVA T. ZLOTNICKA,
MARY G. POWELL, CONSTANCE
H. LAU, PAUL K. ITO, GREGORY
C. HAZELTON, SHELEE M. T.
KIMURA, and TANYE S. Y.
SEKIMURA,

Case No.:
(Other Civil Action)

**VERIFIED SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE COMPLAINT**

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendants,

and,

HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC
INDUSTRIES, INC.
AND HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC
COMPANY, INC.

Nominal Defendant.

Plaintiff Patrick Kallaus (“Plaintiff”), by and through his undersigned counsel, derivatively on behalf of Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. (“Hawaiian Electric” or the “Company”), submits this Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint (the “Complaint”). Plaintiff’s allegations are based upon his personal knowledge as to himself and his own acts, and upon information and belief, developed from the investigation and analysis by Plaintiff’s counsel, including a review of publicly available information, including filings by the Company with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), press releases, news reports, analyst reports, investor conference transcripts, publicly available filings in lawsuits, and matters of public record.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This is a shareholder derivative action brought in the right, and for the benefit, of the Company against certain of its officers and directors seeking to remedy Defendants’ violations of state and federal law that have occurred from February 28, 2019 through August 16, 2023 (the “Relevant Period”) and have caused substantial harm to the Company.

JURISDICTION

2. This Court also has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as the claims asserted herein arise under Sections 10(b),

1 21D, and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This Court also has
2 jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

3 3. This Court has jurisdiction over each defendant named herein because
4 each defendant is either a corporation that conducts business in and maintains
5 operations in this District or is an individual who has sufficient minimum contacts
6 with this District to render the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this District
7 permissible under traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

8 4. Venue is proper in this Court because: (a) the Company maintains its
9 principal place of business in this District; (b) one or more of the defendants either
10 resides in or maintains executive offices in this District; (c) a substantial portion of
11 the transactions and wrongs complained of herein, including Defendants' primary
12 participation in the wrongful acts detailed herein and aiding and abetting and
13 conspiracy in violation of fiduciary duties owed to the Company, occurred in this
14 District; and (d) Defendants have received substantial compensation in this District
15 by doing business here and engaging in numerous activities that had an effect in this
16 District.

17 **THE PARTIES**

18 **Plaintiff**

19 5. *Plaintiff Patrick Kallaus* is, and was at relevant times, a shareholder of
20 the Company. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
21 shareholders in enforcing the rights of the corporation.

22 **Nominal Defendant**

23 6. *Nominal Defendants Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. and Hawaiian*
24 *Electric Company, Inc.* are Hawaii corporations sharing some of the same directors
25 and officers and a corporate headquarters at 1001 Bishop Street, Suite 2900,
26 Honolulu, Hawaii 96813. Hawaiian Electric Industries ("HEI") is a holding company
27 that conducts its business through its wholly owned subsidiary, Hawaiian Electric
28

Company (“HECO”), a public utility. Both Hawaiian Electric Industries and Hawaiian Electric Company will be referred to as “Hawaiian Electric” or the “Company,” except where distinction is necessary.

Director Defendants

7. ***Defendant Timothy E. Johns*** (“Johns”) is and has been at all relevant times a Director of the Company and Chairman of its Board of Directors (the “Board”). The Company’s website states that Defendant Johns has: “[c]orporate governance knowledge and familiarity with financial oversight and fiduciary responsibilities from overseeing the HMSA Internal Audit department, from his prior service as a director for The Gas Company LLC (now Hawaii Gas) and his current service as a trustee of the Parker Ranch Foundation Trust (charitable trust with assets valued at over \$350 million), as a director and Audit Committee Chair for Parker Ranch, Inc. (largest ranch in Hawaii, with significant real estate assets), as a director and Audit Committee member for Grove Farm Company, Inc. (privately-held community and real estate development firm operating on the island of Kauai) and on the board of Kualoa Ranch, Inc.”

8. ***Defendant James A. Ajello*** (“Ajello”) is and has been at all relevant times a Director of the Company and member of its Board’s Audit and Risk Committee, having joined the Company in 2020.

9. ***Defendant Scott W. H. Seu*** (“Seu”) has served as the Company’s President, Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), and Director since January 2022. Defendant Seu also served in several leadership positions at the Company for almost three decades, including serving as (i) President and CEO of the Company from February 2020 to December 2021; (ii) Senior Vice President, Public Affairs, of the Company from January 2017 – February 2020; (iii) Vice President, System Operation, of the Company from May 2014 – December 2016); (iv) Vice President, Energy Resources and Operations, of the Company from January 2013 – April 2014;

1 and (v) Vice President, Energy Resources, of the Company from August 2010 –
2 December 2012. As an expert in risk management and executive with decades of
3 experience running the Company, Defendant Seu was aware of the risks posed to the
4 Company due to potential wildfires and had a duty to address and mitigate such risks.

5 10. ***Defendant Thomas B. Fargo*** (“Fargo”) has served as a Director of the
6 Company since 2005. Defendant Fargo serves and has served at all relevant times as
7 Chairman of the Board and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Company,
8 as well as a member of the Board’s Compensation & Human Capital Management
9 Committee and the Board’s Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee.
10 Defendant Fargo also served as a Director of the Company from 2005 to 2016.

11 11. ***Defendant Celeste A. Connors*** (“Connors”) has served as a director of
12 the Company since 2019. Defendant Connors also serves as a member of the Audit
13 & Risk Committee.

14 12. ***Defendant Elisia K. Flores*** (“Flores”) has served as a director of the
15 Company since 2021. Defendant Flores also serves as a member of the Audit & Risk
16 Committee.

17 13. ***Defendant Peggy Y. Fowler*** (“Fowler”) has served as a director of the
18 Company since 2019. Defendant Fowler served at all relevant times as a member of
19 the Executive Committee, as well as a member of the Board’s Compensation &
20 Human Capital Management Committee and the Board’s Nominating and Corporate
21 Governance Committee. Defendant Fowler also served as a Director from 2009 to
22 2016. Defendant Fowler also previously served in executive roles for nearly four
23 decades at Portland General Electric, including as President and CEO of the utility.
24 As a result of all this experience, Defendant Fowler was well aware of the risks of
25 wildfires and the need to adopt and implement a power shutoff system to avoid such
26 wildfires.

1 14. **Defendant Micah A. Kane** (“Kane”) has served as a Director of the
2 Company since 2019. Defendant Kane also serves as a member of the Compensation
3 & Human Capital Management and Nominating & Corporate Governance
4 Committees.

5 15. **Defendant Yoko Otani** (“Otani”) is and has been a Director of the
6 Company and member of the Board’s Audit and Risk Committee since January 1,
7 2023. The Company represents in its Proxy Statement that: “At the height of the
8 financial crisis in 2008-2009 and thereafter with regulatory reforms in the financial
9 services sector, Ms. Otani advised some of the most prestigious national and
10 international financial services companies on multiple aspects of risk, compliance,
11 business strategy and corporate governance in her role as managing director at a
12 global financial consulting firm.” As an expert in risk management and member of
13 the Company’s Audit and Risk Committee, Defendant Otani was aware of the
14 material risks posed to the Company due to potential wildfires and had a duty to
15 address and mitigate such risks.

16 16. **Defendant Richard J. Dahl** (“Dahl”) is and has been a Director since
17 2017. Defendant Dahl served at all relevant times as a member of the Executive
18 Committee, as well as a member of the Board’s Compensation & Human Capital
19 Management Committee and the Board’s Audit and Risk Committee. The
20 Company’s Proxy Statement dated March 24, 2023 stated that Defendant Dahl is an
21 expert on risk management: “He is an audit, risk management and financial expert
22 from his former chairmanship of the IDACORP, Inc. audit committee, membership
23 on the Dine Brands Global, Inc. audit committee, previous work experience with
24 accounting firm Ernst & Young, and prior licensure as a Certified Public Accountant
25 and Certified Bank Auditor.” Defendant Dahl also served as Director of the
26 Company from 2017-2019.

1 17. **Defendant Keith P. Russell** (“Russell”) was a Director of the Company
2 during the relevant time period, including from at least 2011 to 2023.

3 18. **Defendant Michael J. Kennedy** (“Kennedy”) is and has been a Director
4 of the Company since August 1, 2022.

5 19. **Defendant William James Scilacci, Jr.** (“Scilacci”) is and has been a
6 Director of the Company since 2019. Defendant Scilacci served at all relevant times
7 as a member of the Executive Committee, as well as a member of the Board’s Audit
8 and Risk Committee. The Company’s March 24, 2023 Proxy Statement promotes
9 that Defendant Scilacci has extensive utility experience through his over twenty years
10 in financial management with Southern California Edison, the primary energy supply
11 company for Southern California. The Proxy Statement states that “Mr. Scilacci has
12 a keen understanding and extensive knowledge of enterprise risk management from
13 his role as Chief Financial Officer of Edison International. For eight years, Mr.
14 Scilacci managed Edison International’s enterprise risk management program
15 identifying, monitoring, and forecasting new risks to the company including ESG
16 related risks such as the impacts of climate change.” Thus, Defendant Scilacci was
17 aware of the material risks posed to the Company due to potential wildfires and had a
18 duty to address and mitigate such risks. Defendant Scilacci is a citizen of California.

19 20. **Defendant Thomas B. Fargo** (“Fargo”) is and has been a Director of
20 the Company since 2005. Defendant Fargo also serves and has served at all relevant
21 times as Chairman of the Board and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
22 Company, as well as a member of the Board’s Compensation & Human Capital
23 Management Committee and the Board’s Nominating and Corporate Governance
24 Committee.

25 21. **Defendant Mary E. Kipp** (“Kipp”) is and has been at all relevant times a
26 Director of the Company and member of its Board’s Audit and Risk Committee.
27 Defendant Kipp has also served as President and Chief Executive Officer, Puget
28

1 Sound Energy, Inc., since January 2020. Previously, Defendant Kipp worked at El
 2 Paso Electric Company (NYSE: EE), President 2014-2015, Chief Executive Officer
 3 2015-2017, President and Chief Executive Officer 2017-2019.

4 22. ***Defendant Alana K. Pakkala*** (“Pakkala”) is and has been at all relevant
 5 times a Director of the Company and member of its Board’s Audit and Risk
 6 Committee, having joined the Company in 2020.

7 23. ***Defendant Toby B. Taniguchi*** (“Taniguchi”) is and has been at all
 8 relevant times a Director of the Company and member of its Board’s Audit and Risk
 9 Committee, having joined the Company in 2021.

10 24. ***Defendant Kevin M. Burke*** (“Burke”) was a Company director from
 11 2018 through to 2023. Defendant Burke also served on the Company’s Audit & Risk
 12 Committee during the Relevant Period.

13 25. ***Defendant Eva T. Zlotnicka*** (“Zlotnicka”) was a Company director
 14 from 2020 through to 2021.

15 26. ***Defendant Mary G. Powell*** (“Powell”) was a Company director from
 16 2019 through to 2021.

17 27. The above-named defendants at ¶¶ 7–26 are sometimes referred to
 18 herein collectively as the “Director Defendants.”

19 **Officer Defendants**

20 28. ***Defendant Constance H. Lau*** (“Lau”) served as the Company’s
 21 President and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) from prior to the start of the Relevant
 22 Period until January 2022.

23 29. ***Defendant Paul K. Ito*** (“Ito”) served as the Company’s Interim Chief
 24 Financial Officer (“CFO”) from July 2022 until January 2023, and has served as the
 25 Company’s Executive Vice President, (“EVP”) Treasurer, and CFO since January
 26 2023.

30. ***Defendant Gregory C. Hazelton*** (“Hazelton”) served as the Company’s Vice President (“VP”), CFO, and Treasurer from prior to the start of the Relevant Period until July 2022.

31. ***Defendant Shelee M. T. Kimura*** (“Kimura”) has served as the President and CEO of Hawaiian Electric Company since January 2022, having previously served in other senior roles within the Company for years prior to that, since 2004.

32. ***Defendant Tanye S. Y. Sekimura*** (“Sekimura”) was the Senior Vice President (“SVP”) and CFO of the Company up until her retirement on October 1, 2023, after serving the Company for 32 years.

33. The above-named defendants at ¶¶ 28–32 are referred to herein collectively as the “Officer Defendants”.

34. The Director Defendants and the Officer Defendants are referred to herein as the “Individual Defendants”.

35. The Company and the Individual Defendants are collectively referred to herein as “Defendants.”

FACTS

Background

36. Hawaiian Electric, together with its subsidiaries, engages in the electric utility, banking, and non-regulated renewable/sustainable infrastructure investment businesses in the state of Hawaii. The Company provides service to 95% of Hawaiian residents and operates in three segments, including the Electric Utility segment, which engages in the production, purchase, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity in the islands of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui, Lanai, and Molokai.

37. Hawaiian Electric holds itself out as striving “to be one of the most progressive and highest performing companies in the world, serving the energy needs

of each person in Hawaii with purpose, compassion, empathy, and aloha for our fellow humans and our natural environment.”¹

38. As a utility service based in and serving the citizens of Hawaii, Hawaiian Electric, Inc. is subject to oversight from both federal and state regulators, including by the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”). Accordingly, pursuant to section 8.2 of its General Orders No. 7, the PUC requires that Hawaiian Electric, Inc. “exercise reasonable care to reduce the hazards to which its employees, its customers, and the general public may be subjected.” A failure to conform to or comply with this requirement “shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed \$25,000 for each day such violation, neglect, or failure continues.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 269-28(a). As such, compliance with the PUC’s order is imperative for Hawaiian Electric, Inc. as failure to do so could lead to significant penalties.

39. For an electric utility company, it is essential that their transmission and distribution (“T&D”) components – the transmission lines, substations, distribution lines, and transformers which make up the Electricity Delivery Network in the United States² - are maintained properly in order to be safe, reliable, and resilient. The electric power industry has certain inherent hazards and risks, primarily due to the fact that the T&D components collectively deliver “[a]pproximately four trillion kWh of electric energy” annually across the United States³ and T&D components are exposed to a variety of extreme weather events, as well as general wear and tear.

¹ See <https://www.hei.com/company-profile/about-hawaiian-electric/default.aspx> (last accessed Dec. 04, 2023).

² See U.S. Department of Energy, *Transmission and Distribution Components, Quadrennial Technology Review 2015* (2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/QTR2015-3F-Transmission-and-Distribution_1.pdf (last accessed Dec. 04, 2023).

³ *Id.*

40. Accordingly, the Individual Defendants knew of the attendant risks in not properly maintaining their T&D components and were thus responsible for ensuring that the Company met all relevant regulations, and that safety was ensured.

MATERIALLY FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS

2019 False and Misleading Statements

41. On February 28, 2019, Hawaiian Electric filed an Annual Report on Form 10-K with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the year ended December 31, 2018 (the "2018 10-K"). The 2018 10-K was signed by Defendants Hazelton, Sekimura, Lau, Ito, Dahl, Fargo, Fowler, Russell, Burke, and Kane. In providing an overview of the Company's business, the 2018 10-K stated:

Electric Utility. Hawaiian Electric and its operating utility subsidiaries, Hawaii Electric Light Company, Inc. (Hawaii Electric Light) and Maui Electric Company, Limited (Maui Electric), are regulated electric public utilities that provide essential electric service to approximately 95% of Hawaii's population through the operation of five separate grids that serve communities on the islands of Oahu, Hawaii, and Maui, Lanai and Molokai. Hawaiian Electric's mission is to provide innovative energy leadership for Hawaii, to meet the needs and expectations of customers and communities, and to empower them with affordable, reliable and clean energy. The goal is to create a modern, flexible and dynamic electric grid that enables an optimal mix of distributed energy resources (such as private rooftop solar and battery storage), demand response, and grid-scale resources to achieve the statutory goal of 100% renewable energy by 2045.

42. In discussing the Company's compliance with environmental regulations, the 2018 10-K stated:

Hawaiian Electric, Hawaii Electric Light and Maui Electric [the "Utilities"], like other utilities, are subject to periodic inspections by federal, state and, in some cases, local environmental regulatory agencies, including agencies responsible for the regulation of water quality, air quality, hazardous and other waste and hazardous materials. These inspections may result in the identification of items needing corrective or other action. Except as otherwise disclosed in this report [.

1 . .], *the Company believes that each subsidiary has appropriately*
 2 *responded to environmental conditions requiring action and that, as a*
 3 *result of such actions, such environmental conditions will not have a*
 4 *material adverse effect on the Company or Hawaiian Electric.*
 [Emphasis added].

5 43. In discussing the Company’s executive overview and strategy for its
 6 electric utility segment, the 2018 10-K stated:

7 The Utilities provide electricity on all the principal islands in the state,
 8 other than Kauai, to approximately 95% of the state’s population, and
 9 operate five separate grids. *The Utilities’ mission is to provide*
 10 *innovative energy leadership for Hawaii, to meet the needs and*
 11 *expectations of customers and communities, and to empower them*
 12 *with affordable, reliable and clean energy.* The goal is to create a
 13 modern, flexible, and dynamic electric grid that enables an optimal mix
 14 of distributed energy resources, such as private rooftop solar, demand
 response, and grid-scale resources to enable the creation of smart,
 sustainable, resilient communities and achieve the statutory goal of
 100% renewable energy by 2045. [Emphasis added].

15 44. Appended to the 2018 10-K as an exhibit was a signed certification
 16 pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) by Defendants Lau, Sekimura,
 17 and Hazelton, attesting that “[t]he consolidated information contained in the [2018
 18 10-K] fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
 19 operations of [the Company] and its subsidiaries as of, and for, the periods presented
 20 in this report.”

21 45. Then, on March 25, 2019, the Company filed its Proxy Statement on
 22 Schedule 14A with the SEC, solicited by Defendants Lau, Dahl, Fargo, Fowler, and
 23 Russell (“2019 Proxy Statement”). The 2019 Proxy Statement solicited, *inter alia*: (i)
 24 the election of Defendants Connors, Fargo, and Scilacci to the Board; (ii) approval of
 25 the extension of the term of the Company’s Nonemployee Director stock plan and
 26 increase the shares available for issuance thereunder; and (iii) approval of executive
 27 compensation.
 28

1 46. The 2019 Proxy Statement contained the following information, in
2 relevant part:

3 Culture and Our Teammates

4 *We are dedicated to creating a better Hawaii.* We reflect this
5 commitment through our efforts to provide products and services that
6 enhance our customers' lives, and *in our work to protect Hawaii's*
7 *unique environment*, strengthen our economy, support our communities
and act with integrity and accountability.

8 Our board oversees and works with management to find and cultivate
9 the talent our organization needs to continue delivering value for our
10 shareholders, customers and communities. *Our employees are*
11 *committed to the company's foundational values: integrity, excellence,*
aloha and safety ...

12 Our Focus on Risk Oversight

13 *The board spends a significant time on risk oversight.* We have a
14 board-approved consolidated enterprise risk management system
15 designed to identify and assess risk across the HEI enterprise and report
16 risks to the board, along with proposed strategies for mitigating such
risks.

17 At least annually, the board conducts a strategic planning and risk
18 review, during which we evaluate the company's fundamental financial
19 and business strategies and assess major risks facing the company and
20 options to mitigate those risks ...

21 (Emphasis added).

22 47. Meanwhile, the 2019 Proxy Statement failed to disclose that the
23 Company had inadequate wildfire prevention protocols, their procedures were
24 inadequate to meet the challenges for which they were ostensibly designed, and
25 despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to Maui and the Company's
26 inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a heightened risk of
27

1 devastating wildfires. Had shareholders known of these facts then they would not
2 have approved the above-solicited proposals.

3 48. On August 2, 2019, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on Form
4 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the
5 quarter ended June 30, 2019 (the "Q2 2019 10-Q"). The Q2 2019 10-Q was signed
6 by Defendants Lau, Sekimura, and Hazelton. The Q2 2019 10-Q contained a
7 substantively similar description of the Company's executive overview and strategy
8 for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

9 49. On November 1, 2019, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on
10 Form 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for
11 the quarter ended September 30, 2019 (the "Q3 2019 10-Q"). The Q3 2019 10-Q was
12 signed by Defendants Lau, Sekimura, and Hazelton. The Q3 2019 10-Q contained a
13 substantively similar description of the Company's executive overview and strategy
14 for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

15 50. The above-referenced statements were false and misleading at relevant
16 times. In particular, the individual statements that: (i) "the Company believes that
17 each subsidiary has appropriately responded to environmental conditions requiring
18 action and that, as a result of such actions, such environmental conditions will not
19 have a material adverse effect on the Company or Hawaiian Electric;" and (ii) "[t]he
20 Utilities' mission is to provide innovative energy leadership for Hawaii, to meet the
21 needs and expectations of customers and communities, and to empower them with
22 affordable, reliable and clean energy" were false and misleading when made and/or
23 lacked information necessary to make the statements not misleading because the
24 Individual Defendants failed to disclose that Hawaiian Electric's wildfire prevention
25 and safety protocols and procedures were inadequate to meet the challenges for
26 which they were ostensibly designed and despite knowing the degree of risk that
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wildfires posed to Maui and the Company's inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a heightened risk of devastating wildfires.

2020 False and Misleading Statements

51. On February 28, 2020, Hawaiian Electric filed an Annual Report on Form 10-K with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the year ended December 31, 2019 (the "2019 10-K"). The 2019 10-K was signed by Defendants Lau, Seu, Sekimura, Hazelton, Ito, Connors, Dahl, Fargo, Fowler, Kane, Johns, Russell, Burke, Powell, Zlotnicka, and Scilacci. The 2019 10-K contained substantively similar descriptions of the Company's business, compliance with environmental regulations, and executive overview and strategy of its electric utility segment, as discussed, *supra*, in ¶¶ 42–43.

52. In addition, in discussing the Company's environmental, social and governance ("ESG") risks and opportunities, the 2019 10-K stated:

[ESG] considerations have long been an integral part of HEI's strategy to be a "catalyst for a better Hawaii" for the benefit of all stakeholders. The Company firmly believes that effective management of its ESG risks and opportunities creates a strategic business advantage; improves the lives of our employees, through focus on employee health, wellness, safety, empowerment and increased engagement; improves the sustainability, well-being and resilience of our communities, the state and the environment; and ultimately leads to sustained long-term value creation for our investors.

The [Hawaiian Electric] Board of Directors is responsible for the oversight of the Company's enterprise risk management (ERM) programs, which are designed to address all material risks and opportunities, including ESG considerations. The Board of Directors has delegated the day-to-day responsibility to execute on these action plans to management. The Company believes ESG considerations are embedded in our daily actions and drive how we engage with our employees, communities, and shareholders.

The Company intends to leverage the frameworks developed by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) and the

1 Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) to communicate our
2 approach and progress on ESG matters in future filings.

3 We are committed to achieving a renewable, sustainable energy future,
4 providing leadership in corporate social responsibility, and adhering to
5 governance best practices. [Emphasis added].

6 53. Appended to the 2019 10-K as an exhibit was a signed certification
7 pursuant to SOX by Defendants Lau, Seu, Sekimura, and Hazelton, attesting that
8 “[t]he consolidated information contained in the [2019 10-K] fairly presents, in all
9 material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of [the Company]
10 and its subsidiaries as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.”

11 54. Then, on March 26, 2020, the Company filed its Proxy Statement on
12 Schedule 14A with the SEC, solicited by Defendants Lau, Connors, Dahl, Fargo,
13 Fowler, Kane, Powell, Russell, Scilacci, and Zlotnicka (the “2020 Proxy Statement”).
14 The 2020 Proxy Statement solicited, *inter alia*: (i) the election of Defendants Fowler,
15 Russell, Zlotnicka, and Kane to the Board; and (ii) approval of executive
16 compensation.

17 55. The 2020 Proxy Statement contained the following information, in
18 relevant part:

19 **Board Oversight of Strategy and Risk Management: Investing in**
20 **Hawaii’s Sustainable Future**

21 *Sustainability, or environment, social and governance (ESG),*
22 *considerations have long been an integral part of HEI’s strategy to be*
23 *a “catalyst for a better Hawaii.”* We firmly believe that effective
24 management of ESG risks and opportunities creates a strategic business
25 advantage; improves the sustainability, well-being and resilience of our
communities, our state and our environment; and leads to sustained
long-term value creation for our investors.

26 The Board is responsible for the oversight of HEI’s enterprise risk
27 management (ERM) programs, which are designed to address all
28 material risks and opportunities, including ESG considerations. [...]

1
2 ***This past year, our Board prioritized integrating sustainability even***
3 ***further into our governance structures, decision-making processes***
4 ***and reporting. We focused our strategic retreat on climate change and***
5 ***other ESG factors relevant to our companies.*** Since then, the HEI
6 companies have been further integrating climate change and ESG
7 factors into strategic planning and ERM processes.

8 (Emphasis added).

9 56. Meanwhile, the 2020 Proxy Statement failed to disclose that the
10 Company had inadequate wildfire prevention protocols, their procedures were
11 inadequate to meet the challenges for which they were ostensibly designed, and
12 despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to Maui and the Company's
13 inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a heightened risk of
14 devastating wildfires. Had shareholders known of these facts then they would not
15 have approved the above-solicited proposals.

16 57. On May 5, 2020, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on Form
17 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the
18 quarter ended March 31, 2020 (the "Q1 2020 10-Q"). The Q1 2020 10-Q was signed
19 by Defendants Lau, Seu, Sekimura, and Hazelton. The Q1 2020 10-Q contained a
20 substantively similar description of the Company's executive overview and strategy
21 for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

22 58. On August 6, 2020, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on Form
23 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the
24 quarter ended June 30, 2020 (the "Q2 2020 10-Q"). The Q2 2020 10-Q was signed
25 by Defendants Lau, Seu, Sekimura, and Hazelton. The Q2 2020 10-Q contained a
26 substantively similar description of the Company's executive overview and strategy
27 for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.
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1 59. On September 15, 2020, Hawaiian Electric issued a press release
2 announcing that the Company had released its first ESG report (the “2019 ESG
3 Report”). The press release stated:

4 Hawaiian Electric [. . .] today released its first consolidated report
5 describing its policies, actions and performance data with respect to
6 [ESG] and sustainability-related matters. Such reports are frequently
7 referred to as “ESG” reports and are becoming increasingly common as
8 investors seek to understand how public companies are impacting the
environment and society, as well as potential opportunities and risks to
companies’ long-term financial and operational strength.

9 “We’re proud to issue our first consolidated [Hawaiian Electric] ESG
10 report to help customers, employees, investors and other stakeholders
11 understand how [Hawaiian Electric’s] strategies and operations advance
12 ESG outcomes and create long-term value for all stakeholders,” said
[Defendant Lau[.]]

13 “While this is our first consolidated [Hawaiian Electric] ESG report,
14 ESG principles and sustainability have long been fundamental values of
15 [Hawaiian Electric], so much so that we’ve often said that ESG is in our
16 DNA. With all of our operations in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, we
17 know that our company’ long-term health is inextricably linked with the
18 strength of the economy, communities, and environment of the
19 Hawaiian Islands. This linkage is all the more clear in the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic, and we’re working hard to help our customers,
employees and communities through this period and to help our
economy recover,” said Lau.

20
21 60. That same day, Hawaiian Electric published its 2019 ESG Report. In
22 discussing sustainability governance, the 2019 ESG Report stated:

23 We see ESG-related strategies and risks as having the same potential as
24 other strategies and risks to impact long-term value creation. As such,
25 we’ve integrated material ESG factors into company governance
26 structures and management activities. Just like other strategies and
risks, we’re identifying, measuring, managing and assigning
accountability for material ESG issues.

27 Company strategies are overseen by the Board as a whole and are
28

1 managed through our strategic planning and oversight process. The
 2 Board provides guidance on strategic priorities and plans, including at
 3 its annual strategic retreat, and approves the budget to allocate resources
 4 for agreed upon strategies.

5 ***Our full Board reviews and provides input on major risks for our***
 6 ***companies and determines our risk appetite. This includes risks***
 7 ***relating to safety and potential physical risk to utility infrastructure or***
 8 ***to bank loan collateral from climate change impacts.*** The [Hawaiian
 9 Electric] Audit & Risk Committee assists the Board in its risk oversight
 10 role by overseeing our Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) program,
 11 which is designed to identify and assess key risks across the [Hawaiian
 12 Electric] enterprise and report such risks to the Board, along with
 13 strategies for mitigating such risks. The Hawaiian Electric Audit & Risk
 14 Committee and the ASB Audit Committee and Risk Committee assist in
 15 risk oversight of those subsidiaries.

16 The [Hawaiian Electric] Nominating & Corporate Governance
 17 Committee (NCG Committee) reviews strategies and risks involving
 18 governance and assesses leadership development and succession
 19 planning to ensure we have the right leadership to execute our strategies.
 20 The role of the NCG Committee has recently expanded to include
 21 review of human capital management and ensuring ESG oversight.
 22 [Emphasis added].

23 61. Further in discussing environmental commitment and management, the
 24 2019 ESG Report stated:

25 Our customers and communities expect that through our daily
 26 operations we will protect our air and water, reduce waste, and conserve
 27 natural resources. More than 30 environmental professionals, including
 28 scientists, engineers, chemists, and a wildlife biologist work full-time at
 our company to ensure that employees and external contractors
 understand and comply with all applicable environmental laws,
 regulations, permitting requirements and procedures regarding air and
 water quality, noise control, hazardous materials, and protected species.

Our Environmental Division's mission is to ensure that the company
 fulfills its kuleana, responsibility, to protect Hawai'i's unique
 environment through environmental compliance and stewardship and

1 timely, innovative, cost-effective Environmental Management Programs
2 and Standard Operating Procedures, which are comprehensive and
3 formalized.

4 Critical elements of the programs and procedures include year-round
5 risk and opportunities assessment, continuous improvement, compliance
6 management and tracking, air and water quality monitoring, and
7 extensive environmental compliance training in air quality requirements,
8 spill prevention control and countermeasures, storm water runoff, proper
9 handling and disposal of hazardous materials, and protected species
10 awareness and protection. All contractors and subcontractors working
11 at Hawaiian Electric sites are required to attend Contractor
12 Environmental Orientation training, conducted by our environmental
13 staff.

14 Internal audits are conducted to verify compliance with environmental
15 permits, regulations and policies, and fulfill corporate risk management
16 requirements. Our internal Corporate Audit Team audits the
17 Environmental Division at least once every three years. Audit reports
18 are used to create Management Action Plans, ensuring that highest risk
19 items are given priority and addressed in a timely manner. The
20 Environmental Division also performs periodic environmental
21 compliance audits of our company facilities to identify areas for
22 improvement.

23 62. Finally, in discussing the Company's purported commitment to safety,
24 the 2019 ESG Report stated:

25 Safety is our number one priority at Hawaiian Electric. Our goal is to
26 provide a safe and healthy work environment, where every employee
27 makes safety a central part of his or her job.

28 Our safety commitment is to provide and support:

- Managerial responsibility for health and safety issues
- ***Procedures for hazard identification and safety risk assessment***
- Operating health and safety guidelines, procedures, and policies
- ***Emergency planning and preparedness procedures***
- Safety performance monitoring, measurement, and reporting
- Internal and external health and safety audits. [Emphasis added].

63. On November 6, 2020, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the quarter ended September 30, 2020 (the "Q3 2020 10-Q"). The Q3 2020 10-Q was signed by Defendants Lau, Seu, Sekimura, and Hazelton. The Q3 2020 10-Q contained a substantively similar description of the Company's executive overview and strategy for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

64. The above-referenced statements were false and misleading at relevant times. In particular, the individual statements that: (i) "Our full Board reviews and provides input on major risks for our companies and determines our risk appetite. This includes risks relating to safety and potential physical risk to utility infrastructure [...];" (ii) "Audit reports are used to create Management Action Plans, ensuring that highest risk items are given priority and addressed in a timely manner;" (iii) "Safety is our number one priority at Hawaiian Electric;" and (iv) that the Company's "safety commitment is to provide" "[p]rocedures for hazard identification and safety risk assessment," and "[e]mergency planning and preparedness procedures" were false and misleading when made and/or lacked information necessary to make the statements not misleading because the Individual Defendants failed to disclose that Hawaiian Electric's wildfire prevention and safety protocols and procedures were inadequate to meet the challenges for which they were ostensibly designed and despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to Maui and the Company's inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a heightened risk of devastating wildfires.

2021 False and Misleading Statements

65. On February 26, 2021, Hawaiian Electric filed an Annual Report on Form 10-K with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the year ended December 31, 2020 (the "2020 10-K"). The 2020 10-K was signed by Defendants Lau, Seu, Sekimura, Johns, Ajello, Hazelton, Ito, Connors, Dahl, Fargo,

1 Fowler, Kane, Pakkala, Russell, Burke, Powell, Zlotnicka, and Scilacci. The 2020
 2 10-K contained substantively similar descriptions of the Company’s business,
 3 compliance with environmental regulations, executive overview and strategy of its
 4 electric utility segment, and purported commitment to ESG principles as discussed,
 5 *supra*, at ¶¶ 42–43, and 62.

6 66. Appended to the 2020 10-K as an exhibit was a signed certification
 7 pursuant to SOX by Defendants Lau, Seu, Sekimura, and Hazelton, attesting that
 8 “[t]he consolidated information contained in the [2020 10-K] fairly presents, in all
 9 material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of [the Company]
 10 and its subsidiaries as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.”

11 67. Then, on March 26, 2021, the Company filed its Proxy Statement on
 12 Schedule 14A with the SEC, solicited by Defendants Lau, Connors, Dahl, Fargo,
 13 Fowler, Kane, Powell, Russell, Scilacci, and Zlotnicka (the “2021 Proxy Statement”).
 14 The 2021 Proxy Statement solicited, *inter alia*: (i) election of Defendants Dahl,
 15 Kane, and Lau to the Board; and (ii) approval of executive compensation.

16 68. The 2021 Proxy Statement contained the following information, in
 17 relevant part:

18 Board Oversight of ESG Strategy and Risk Management

19 *We firmly believe that effective management of ESG risks and*
 20 *opportunities creates a strategic advantage; improves the*
 21 *sustainability, well-being and resilience of our communities, our*
 22 *economy and our environment; and leads to sustained long-term value*
 23 *creation for our investors.*

24 [...]

25 In 2020, our Board fully integrated material ESG factors into the
 26 company’s governance structures and oversight of management
 27 activities. We expanded the responsibilities of the Nominating &
 28 Corporate Governance Committee to include overseeing human capital

1 management and ensuring all material ESG areas have appropriate
2 oversight.

3 [...]

4 The new performance-based regulation (PBR) framework, developed
5 with our regulators and stakeholders, ***further incentivizes the utility to***
6 ***achieve ESG outcomes relating to increasing renewable energy,***
7 ***facilitating customer participation in the clean energy transition,***
8 ***modernizing our grid*** and advancing affordability and customer
equity...

9 (Emphasis added).

10 69. Meanwhile, the 2021 Proxy Statement failed to disclose that the
11 Company had inadequate wildfire prevention protocols, their procedures were
12 inadequate to meet the challenges for which they were ostensibly designed, and
13 despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to Maui and the Company's
14 inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a heightened risk of
15 devastating wildfires. Had shareholders known of these facts then they would not
16 have approved the above-solicited proposals.

17 70. On April 22, 2021, Hawaiian Electric issued a press release announcing
18 that the Company had issued a consolidated ESG report (the "2020 ESG Report").
19 The press release stated:

20 Hawaiian Electric [. . .] today released an updated consolidated report
21 describing its policies, actions and performance with respect to a
22 number of [ESG] matters, including climate-related risks and
23 opportunities.

24 ***

25 "With all of our operations in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, we know
26 that our company's long-term health is inextricably linked with the
27 strength of the economy, communities, and environment of the
Hawaiian Islands. That's why ESG and sustainability considerations are

1 at the core of our mission to be a catalyst for a better Hawai'i," said
2 [Defendant] Lau[.]

3 "Since issuing our inaugural ESG report last fall, we have continued our
4 cross-enterprise work to further integrate ESG and climate-related
5 factors into our governance, strategies, risk management and reporting.
6 This second consolidated ESG report provides an update on our ESG
7 efforts and reflects our commitment to continuous improvement,
8 transparency and accountability surrounding these very important
9 issues," said Lau.

10 71. That same day, Hawaiian Electric published its 2020 ESG Report. The
11 2020 ESG Report contained substantively similar descriptions of the Company's
12 policies regarding sustainability governance and risk management, environmental
13 management, and purported commitment to safety as discussed, *supra*, in ¶¶ 60–62.

14 72. On May 10, 2021, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on Form
15 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the
16 quarter ended March 31, 2021 (the "Q1 2021 10-Q"). The Q1 2021 10-Q was signed
17 by Defendants Lau, Seu, Sekimura, and Hazelton. The Q1 2021 10-Q contained a
18 substantively similar description of the Company's executive overview and strategy
19 for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

20 73. On August 9, 2021, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on Form
21 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the
22 quarter ended June 30, 2021 (the "Q2 2021 10-Q"). The Q2 2021 10-Q was signed
23 by Defendants Lau, Seu, Sekimura, and Hazelton. The Q2 2021 10-Q contained a
24 substantively similar description of the Company's executive overview and strategy
25 for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

26 74. On November 5, 2021, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on
27 Form 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for
28 the quarter ended September 30, 2021 (the "Q3 2021 10-Q"). The Q3 2021 10-Q
was signed by Defendants Lau, Seu, Sekimura, and Hazelton. The Q3 2021 10-Q

1 contained a substantively similar description of the Company’s executive overview
 2 and strategy for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

3 75. The above-referenced statements were false and misleading at relevant
 4 times. In particular, the same statements described, *supra*, at ¶ 64 and repeated by
 5 the Company in its 2021 filings were false and misleading when made and/or lacked
 6 information necessary to make the statements not misleading because the Individual
 7 Defendants failed to disclose that Hawaiian Electric’s wildfire prevention and safety
 8 protocols and procedures were inadequate to meet the challenges for which they were
 9 ostensibly designed and despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to
 10 Maui and the Company’s inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at
 11 a heightened risk of devastating wildfires.

12 **2022 False and Misleading Statements**

13 76. On February 25, 2022, Hawaiian Electric filed an Annual Report on
 14 Form 10-K with the SEC, reporting the Company’s financial and operating results for
 15 the year ended December 31, 2021 (the “2021 10-K”). The 2021 10-K was signed by
 16 Defendants Seu, Hazelton, Sekimura, Johns, Ajello, Kimura, Ito, Connors, Dahl,
 17 Fargo, Flores, Fowler, Kane, Taniguchi, Pakkala, Russell, Burke, and Scilacci. The
 18 2021 10-K contained substantively similar descriptions of the Company’s business,
 19 compliance with environmental regulations, executive overview and strategy of its
 20 electric utility segment, and purported commitment to ESG principles as discussed,
 21 *supra*, in ¶¶ 42–43 and 62.

22 77. Appended to the 2021 10-K as an exhibit was a signed certification
 23 pursuant to SOX by Defendants Seu, Sekimura, Kimura, and Hazelton, attesting that
 24 “[t]he consolidated information contained in the [2021 10-K] fairly presents, in all
 25 material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of [the Company]
 26 and its subsidiaries as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.”

78. On March 18, 2022 the Company filed its Proxy Statement on Schedule 14A with the SEC, solicited by Defendants Connors, Dahl, Fargo, Flores, Fowler, Kane, Russell, Scilacci, and Seu (the “2022 Proxy Statement”). The 2022 Proxy Statement solicited, *inter alia*: (i) the election of Defendants Connors, Dahl, Fargo, Flores, Kane, Scilacci, and Seu to the Board; and (ii) approval of executive compensation.

79. The 2022 Proxy Statement contained the following information, in relevant part:

Board Oversight of Strategy and Risk Management

Effective management of risks and opportunities improves the sustainability, well-being and resilience of our communities, our state and our environment [...]

As a Board, we see ESG-related strategies and risks as having the same potential as other strategies and risks to impact long-term value creation. As a result, we deliberately composed our Board to ensure we have directors who have direct experience related to ESG topics, including renewable energy, climate change strategy and environmental management.

Our full Board reviews and provides input on our strategies and major risks and determines our risk appetite. *This includes risks relating to safety, other human capital considerations and climate change.*

[...]

* * *

[Hawaiian Electric – Focused on achieving aggressive climate goals in a way that is affordable, *reliable and resilient* for our customers.

(Emphasis added)

80. Meanwhile, the 2022 Proxy Statement failed to disclose that the Company had inadequate wildfire prevention protocols, their procedures were

1 inadequate to meet the challenges for which they were ostensibly designed, and
 2 despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to Maui and the Company's
 3 inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a heightened risk of
 4 devastating wildfires. Had shareholders known of these facts then they would not
 5 have approved the above-solicited proposals.

6 81. On April 12, 2022, Hawaiian Electric issued a press release announcing
 7 that the Company had issued a consolidated ESG report (the "2021 ESG Report").
 8 The press release quoted Defendant Seu, stating: "[o]ur ESG progress demonstrates
 9 our commitment not only to operating a sustainable business, but also to building a
 10 sustainable Hawai'i in which our children and grandchildren, our communities, our
 11 customers and our fellow employees will thrive together now and for generations to
 12 come," and "[o]ur company has been serving Hawai'i for over 130 years, and this
 13 deep-felt mindset comes naturally to us as a longstanding business in our island state.
 14 The alignment between ESG principles, state policy in Hawai'i, community
 15 expectations, and our goals as a company has never been stronger."

16 82. That same day, Hawaiian Electric published the 2021 ESG Report. The
 17 2021 ESG Report contained substantively similar descriptions of the Company's
 18 policies regarding sustainability governance and risk management, environmental
 19 management, and purported commitment to safety as discussed, *supra*, in ¶¶ 60–62.

20 83. In addition, in discussing reliability and resilience, the 2021 ESG Report
 21 stated:

22 We are focused on ensuring the resilience of our system. Our efforts include:

- 23 • Using advanced climate risk modeling to assess risks and inform
 24 our planning process
- 25 • Deploying advanced meters and other technologies that allow us
 26 to respond more quickly to system interruptions
- 27 • *Developing damage prediction modeling to estimate damage and*
 28

outages from severe natural event scenarios in order to support resilience planning efforts

- Developing plans for community microgrids and/or critical customer hubs to be able to quickly restore power to critical customers
- Building more modern and efficient power plants inland, away from the coastline. An example is the Schofield Generating Station, which was completed and brought online in 2018. The biofuel-capable generating facility is located on military property inland at a higher elevation. It can be isolated to serve the military base and other critical facilities in the event of an emergency, and feeds electricity to the grid that serves all O’ahu customers the rest of the time.
- Collaborating with key partners, such as military, to supply energy to customers during an emergency
- Engaging with stakeholders to incorporate resilience needs and priorities through our Integrated Grid Planning process, including its Resilience Working Group.

We continually maintain and upgrade our transmission and distribution system to ensure seamless delivery of power to our customers. Day-to-day maintenance is a key part of keeping the grid resilient. We regularly inspect our poles, lines, and other equipment, and work to replace and upgrade aging and faulty equipment before failures happen. We regularly trim the vegetation around our equipment, as many power outages during high winds and storms are due to tree branches or other vegetation falling onto power lines. We have also replaced traditional power lines with insulated conductor systems to improve reliability and resilience in targeted areas prone to vegetation-related outages.

We’re working to reduce the impact of outages by adding devices to section off parts of the grid to reduce the number of customers affected by an outage. We have also completed distribution protection studies to improve safety and mitigate risk on each of the five islands we serve.

1 We measure and report reliability performance using metrics commonly
 2 used in the electric utility industry regarding the duration and frequency
 3 of power interruptions for customers.

4 Both the company (through performance incentives) and executives
 5 (through executive compensation goals) have financial incentives to
 6 promote strong reliability performance.

7 We are working on a multi-year plan and PUC application focused on
 8 foundational investments in transmission and distribution system
 9 resilience. Our proposed plan will include:

- 10 • Strengthening our most critical transmission lines to withstand
 11 extreme winds
- 12 • Hardening distribution lines serving critical community lifeline
 13 facilities such as hospitals, military sites, communications
 14 infrastructure, water and wastewater facilities, ports and
 15 emergency response facilities
- 16 • Upgrading specific poles to improve restoration after a storm or
 17 hurricane
- 18 • Moving lines underground in targeted areas prone to vegetation-
 19 related damage
- 20 • Removing large trees that are at risk of falling into lines during a
 21 storm
- 22 • ***Strengthening lines and deploying devices to help prevent and
 23 respond to wildfires***
- 24 • Installing equipment in select substations to reduce flood impacts.
 25 [Emphasis added].

26 84. In discussing wildfire prevention and mitigation, the 2021 ESG Report
 27 stated:

28 Episodic drought, a warming climate and the expansion of nonnative
 fire-prone grasses and shrubs has led to an increase in wildfires in

1 Hawai'i. 98% of wildfires in Hawai'i are human caused and the threat to
2 communities is high year-round. In addition to the utility's own wildfire
3 mitigation plans, we have joined with community members and wildfire
4 collaborators to help prevent and mitigate wildfires in known hot spots
5 across our service areas. As members of the Wai'anae Wildfire Hui in
6 West O'ahu and Pacific Fire Exchange on Maui, we meet monthly to
7 share ideas and discuss priority projects. We support the Hawai'i
8 Wildfire Management Organization on Hawai'i Island, which works
9 with communities across the state on wildfire planning, prevention and
mitigation activities. By raising awareness, implementing key land
management practices and collaborating on projects, these organizations
are working to reduce the wildfire risk in Hawai'i and build strong,
resilient communities.

10 85. On May 9, 2022, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on Form
11 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the
12 quarter ended March 31, 2022 (the "Q1 2022 10-Q"). The Q1 2022 10-Q was signed
13 by Defendants Seu, Sekimura, Kimura, and Hazelton. The Q1 2022 10-Q contained
14 a substantively similar description of the Company's executive overview and strategy
15 for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

16 86. On August 8, 2022, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on Form
17 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for the
18 quarter ended June 30, 2022 (the "Q2 2022 10-Q"). The Q2 2022 10-Q was signed
19 by Defendants Seu, Sekimura, Kimura, and Ito. The Q2 2022 10-Q contained a
20 substantively similar description of the Company's executive overview and strategy
21 for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

22 87. On November 7, 2022, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on
23 Form 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company's financial and operating results for
24 the quarter ended September 30, 2022 (the "Q3 2022 10-Q"). The Q3 2022 10-Q
25 was signed by Defendants Seu, Sekimura, Kimura, and Ito. The Q3 2022 10-Q
26 contained a substantively similar description of the Company's executive overview
27 and strategy for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.
28

88. The above-referenced statements were false and misleading at relevant times. In particular, the same statements described, *supra*, at ¶ 64 and repeated by the Company in its 2022 filings as well as: (i) “[w]e are focused on ensuring the resilience of our system” by “[d]eploying advanced meters and other technologies that allow us to respond more quickly to system interruptions,” “[d]eploying damage prediction modeling to estimate damage and outages from severe natural event scenarios in order to support resilience planning efforts;” (ii) [w]e continually maintain and upgrade our transmission and distribution system to ensure seamless delivery of power to our customers;” (iii) [w]e regularly inspect our poles, lines, and other equipment, and work to replace and upgrade aging and faulty equipment before failures happen;” (iv) [w]e regularly trim the vegetation around our equipment, as many power outages during high winds and storms are due to tree branches or other vegetation falling onto power lines;” and (v) “[w]e support the Hawai’i Wildfire Management Organization on Hawai’i Island, which works with communities across the state on wildfire planning, prevention and mitigation activities” were false and misleading when made and/or lacked information necessary to make the statements not misleading.

89. The Individual Defendants failed to disclose that, *inter alia*, Hawaiian Electric’s wildfire prevention and safety protocols and procedures were inadequate to meet the challenges for which they were ostensibly designed and despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to Maui and the Company’s inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a heightened risk of devastating wildfires, as well as the fact that the Company did not maintain its equipment and in fact had old, decaying equipment that went without necessary maintenance.

2023 False and Misleading Statements

90. On February 27, 2023, Hawaiian Electric filed an Annual Report on Form 10-K with the SEC, reporting the Company’s financial and operating results for

the year ended December 31, 2022 (the “2022 10-K”). The 2022 10-K was signed by Defendants Seu, Ito, Sekimura, Kimura, Johns, Ajello, Connors, Dahl, Fargo, Flores, Fowler, Kane, Otani, Kipp, Pakkala, Taniguchi, Russell, Kennedy, and Scilacci. The 2022 10-K contained substantively similar descriptions of the Company’s business, compliance with environmental regulations, executive overview and strategy of its electric utility segment, and purported commitment to ESG principles, as discussed, *supra*, in ¶¶ 42–43 and 62.

91. Appended to the 2022 10-K as an exhibit was a signed certification pursuant to SOX by Defendants Seu, Sekimura, Kimura, and Ito, attesting that “[t]he consolidated information contained in the [2022 10-K] fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of [the Company] and its subsidiaries as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.”

92. On March 24, 2023 the Company filed its Proxy Statement on Schedule 14A with the SEC, solicited by Defendants Connors, Dahl, Fargo, Flores, Fowler, Kane, Kennedy, Otani, Russell, Scilacci, and Seu (the “2023 Proxy Statement”). The 2023 Proxy Statement solicited, *inter alia*: (i) the election of Defendants Connors, Dahl, Fargo, Flores, Fowler, Kane, Kennedy, Otani, Scilacci, and Seu to the Board; and (ii) approval of executive compensation.

93. The 2023 Proxy Statement contained the following information, in relevant part:

Board Oversight of Strategy and Risk Management

Effective management of risks and opportunities leads to sustained long-term value creation for our investors and ***improves the sustainability, well-being and resilience of our communities, our state and our environment.***

Our full Board reviews and provides input on our strategies and major risks and determines our risk appetite. ***This includes risks relating to a number of topics, including but not limited to, safety, other human capital considerations and climate change. [...]***

1
2 As a Board, we consider ESG-related strategies and risks in the context
3 of our overall company strategies and risks. As such, we have integrated
4 oversight of ESG risks and opportunities into our existing Board and
5 committee responsibilities. In considering our Board composition, we
6 also ensure we have directors who have direct experience related to ESG
7 topics relevant to our strategies, including renewable energy, climate
8 change strategy and environmental management.

9 * * *

10 HEI's Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) function is principally
11 responsible for identifying and monitoring risk at the holding company
12 and its subsidiaries, and for reporting on high-risk areas to the Board
13 and designated Board committees. *As a result, all HEI directors,
14 including those who serve on the Compensation & Human Capital
15 Management Committee, are apprised of risks that could reasonably
16 be expected to have a material adverse effect on HEI.*

17 (Emphasis added)

18 94. Meanwhile, the 2023 Proxy Statement failed to disclose that the
19 Company had inadequate wildfire prevention protocols, their procedures were
20 inadequate to meet the challenges for which they were ostensibly designed, and
21 despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to Maui and the Company's
22 inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a heightened risk of
23 devastating wildfires. Had shareholders known of these facts then they would not
24 have approved the above-solicited proposals.

25 95. On April 4, 2023, Hawaiian Electric issued a press release announcing
26 that the Company had released its latest ESG report (the "2022 ESG Report"). The
27 press release stated:

28 Hawaiian Electric [. . .] today announced the publication of its newest
consolidated report describing its updated policies, actions and
performance for 2022 with respect to a range of environmental, social
and governance (ESG) matters. This is HEI's fourth annual ESG report.

1 “Our [Hawaiian Electric] family of companies is guided by a common
2 purpose to create a better Hawai’i – one that is thriving economically,
3 environmentally, culturally and socially,” said [Defendant] Seu[.] “We
4 believe this purpose serves the long-term interests of all of our
5 stakeholders – it inspires us to act in ways that allow us not simply to
6 advance, but to leap forward into a future that’s brighter for us all.”

7 The theme of HEI’s latest ESG report is “Laulima,” which translates to
8 “many hands working together.” The report details the work of all of the
9 [Hawaiian Electric] companies in 2022 toward their common purpose,
10 including in areas such as decarbonization; economic health and
11 affordability; reliability and resilience diversity, equity and inclusion;
12 and human capital management.

13 96. That same day, Hawaiian Electric published its 2022 ESG Report. The
14 2022 ESG Report contained substantively similar descriptions of the Company’s
15 policies regarding sustainability governance and risk management, environmental
16 management, purported commitment to safety, reliability and resilience, and wildfire
17 prevention and mitigation, as discussed, *supra*, in ¶¶ 60–62 and 83–84.

18 97. On May 9, 2023, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on Form
19 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company’s financial and operating results for the
20 quarter ended March 31, 2023 (the “Q1 2023 10-Q”). The Q1 2023 10-Q was signed
21 by Defendants Seu, Sekimura, Kimura, and Ito. The Q1 2023 10-Q contained a
22 substantively similar description of the Company’s executive overview and strategy
23 for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

24 98. On August 7, 2023, Hawaiian Electric filed a Quarterly Report on Form
25 10-Q with the SEC, reporting the Company’s financial and operating results for the
26 quarter ended June 30, 2023 (the “Q2 2023 10-Q”). The Q2 2023 10-Q was signed
27 by Defendants Seu, Sekimura, Kimura, and Ito. The Q2 2023 10-Q contained a
28 substantively similar description of the Company’s executive overview and strategy
for its electric utility segment as discussed, *supra*, in ¶ 43.

1 trigger dangerous fire conditions across much of the island and Hawaii.

2 The state's electric utility responded with some preemptive steps but did
3 not use what is widely regarded as the most aggressive but effective
4 safety measure: shutting down the power.

5 Hawaiian Electric, the utility that oversees Maui Electric and provides
6 service to 95 percent of the state's residents, did not deploy what's
7 known as a "public power shutoff plan," which involves intentionally
8 cutting off electricity to areas where big wind events could spark fires.
9 A number of states, including California, have increasingly adopted this
10 safety strategy after what were then the nation's most destructive and
11 deadliest modern fires, in 2017 and 2018.

12 Hawaiian Electric was aware that a power shut-off was an effective
13 strategy, documents show, but had not adopted it as part of its fire
14 mitigation plans, according to the company and two former power and
15 energy officials interviewed by The Washington Post. Nor, in the face of
16 predicted dangerous winds, did it act on its own, utility officials said,
17 fearing uncertain consequences.

18 The decision to avoid shutting off power is reflective of the utility's
19 struggles to bolster its aging and vulnerable infrastructure against
20 wildfires, said Jennifer Potter, who lives in Lahaina and was a member
21 of the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission until just nine months ago.

22 "They were not as proactive as they should have been," Potter said
23 about Hawaiian Electric's fire-prevention planning, adding that there
24 had not been any real meaningful action to "address some of those
25 inadequacies in terms of wildfire." Doug McLeod, a former energy
26 commissioner for Maui County, also said the utility was aware of the
27 need for a regular shut-down system and to bury lines, especially given
28 the "number of close calls in the past."

Earlier this week, high winds caused widespread damage to utility
infrastructure. The intense gusts knocked down about 30 utility poles
across the region, many onto trees and roads, complicating evacuations,
according to Maui County Mayor Richard Bissen. He confirmed that
some electrical lines were energized when they hit the ground.

1 102. On this news, Hawaiian Electric's stock price fell \$10.94 per share, or
2 33.76%, to close at \$21.46 per share on August 14, 2023.

3 103. Then, on August 16, 2023, *The Wall Street Journal* published an article
4 entitled "Hawaiian Electric Is in Talks With Restructuring Firms." The article stated:

5 Hawaiian Electric is speaking with firms that specialize in restructuring
6 advisory work, exploring options to address the electric utility's
7 financial and legal challenges arising from the Maui wildfires, said
8 people familiar with the matter.

9 Hawaiian Electric is facing a sell off in its stock and bonds, and has
10 been hit with lawsuits alleging that its actions both before and during the
11 wildfires exacerbated the devastation Maui residents have suffered.

12 The company is in discussions over the strategies it can pursue and to
13 determine whether it needs to hire legal and financial advisers, the
14 people said.

15 On Thursday evening, a day after the publication of this report, a
16 company spokesperson said: "Like any company in this situation would
17 do, and as we do in the normal course of business, we are seeking advice
18 from experts—the goal is not to restructure the company but to endure
19 as a financially strong utility that Maui and this state need."

20 More customer lawsuits are expected in coming weeks to increase the
21 costs of defending and settling claims for Hawaiian Electric just as its
22 access to financing is being threatened.

23 S&P Global Ratings downgraded Hawaiian Electric's credit rating to
24 junk on Tuesday, saying the wildfires destroyed a significant segment of
25 the company's customer base and will take many years to restore. S&P
26 also said that wildfire lawsuits seeking compensation for injuries, deaths
27 and property damage will weigh on the company's credit quality.

28 104. On August 17, 2023, *The Wall Street Journal* published an article
entitled "Hawaiian Electric Knew of Wildfire Threat, but Waited Years to Act." The
article stated:

 During the 2019 wildfire season, one of the worst Maui had ever seen,

1 Hawaiian Electric concluded that it needed to do far more to prevent its
2 power lines from emitting sparks.

3 The utility examined California's plans to reduce fires ignited by power
4 lines, started flying drones over its territory and vowed to take steps to
5 protect its equipment and its customers from the threat of fire.

6 Nearly four years later, the company has completed little such work.
7 Between 2019 and 2022, it invested less than \$245,000 on wildfire-
8 specific projects on the island, regulatory filings show. It didn't seek
9 state approval to raise rates to pay for broad wildfire-safety
10 improvements until 2022, and has yet to receive it.

11 Now, the company is facing scrutiny, litigation and a financial crisis
12 over indications that its power lines might have played a role in igniting
13 the deadliest U.S. wildfire in more than a century. The blaze has caused
14 at least 110 deaths destroyed the historic town of Lahaina and resulted in
15 an estimated billions of dollars in damage.

16 The fire's cause hasn't been determined, but mounting evidence
17 suggests the utility's equipment was involved. One video taken by a
18 resident shows a downed power line igniting dry grass along a road near
19 Lahaina. A firm that monitors grid sensors reported dozens of electrical
20 disruptions in the hours before the fire began, including one that
21 coincided in time with video footage of a flash of light from power lines.

22 Hawaiian Electric said it would investigate any role its infrastructure
23 may have played and cooperate with a separate probe into the fire
24 launched last week by the Hawaii attorney general.

25 "We all believe it's important to understand what happened. And I think
26 we all believe it's important to make sure it doesn't happen again," said
27 Shelee Kimura, Hawaiian Electric's chief executive.

28 In response to questions about its wildfire-mitigation spending, a
spokesman for Hawaiian Electric said the company reduces wildfire risk
through its routine utility work, including trimming or removing trees
and upgrading, replacing and inspecting equipment. It said it has spent
about \$84 million on maintenance and tree work in Maui County since
2018.

1
2 The utility has long been a force in Hawaii politics and business. In the
3 wake of the fire, its finances are reeling. Its stock has plunged 49% this
4 week, and its credit rating was downgraded to junk by S&P.

5 ***

6 At the end of 2019, Hawaiian Electric issued a press release about
7 wildfire risk. It said it would install heavier, insulated conductors on
8 Maui and Oahu to minimize the risk of sparks when winds picked up, as
9 well as technology to detect disruptions when the conductors came into
10 contact with vegetation or each other. It said it would apply fire
retardant on poles in risky areas and consider installing cameras and
other devices to monitor weather conditions during fire season.

11 In filings over the next two years with the Hawaii Public Utilities
12 Commission, which is tasked with approving utility projects and
13 spending, the company made only passing reference to wildfire
mitigation.

14 105. Following the publications of *The Wall Street Journal* articles,
15 Hawaiian Electric's stock price fell \$2.54 per share, or 17.43% to close at \$12.03 per
16 share on August 17, 2023.

17 106. On August 27, 2023, Hawaii Electric issued a press release wherein
18 the Company admitted that its electrical equipment started the Maui wildfire, stating
19 "[a] fire at 6:30 a.m. (the 'Morning Fire') appears to have been caused by power
20 lines that fell in high winds." The Company, however, disclaimed any responsibility
21 for the second fire that ignited later that same day, despite the fire breaking out in the
22 same area as the Morning Fire and the evidence pointing to the second fire being a
23 continuation of the Morning Fire caused by the Company.

24 107. As a result of the foregoing, the Company's share price has suffered
25 an immense fall from a Relevant Period high of \$55.15 on March 18, 2020 to \$13.27
26 on December 6, 2023, representing a total 75.94% decrease in the Company's share
27 price as a result of the wrongdoing as alleged herein.
28

THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' KNOWLEDGE

108. Throughout the Relevant Period, the Individual Defendants knew that Hawaiian Electric's wildfire prevention and safety protocols and procedures were inadequate to meet the challenges for which they were ostensibly designed and despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to Maui, the Company's inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a heightened risk of devastating wildfire. Despite their knowledge, the Individual Defendants continued to issue the above false and misleading statements and failed to omit facts necessary to make their statements not false and misleading.

109. In 2018, and the years following, the Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization identified Lahaina as a hotspot for potential wildfires due to the area's dry, windy, and hot characteristics. Moreover, in 2020, Lahaina was identified as a High-Risk Wildfire Area in the Maui County Hazard Mitigation Plan Update.

110. The Individual Defendants knew that the Company's electrical infrastructure was in dire need of repair as in 2019, the Company concluded that it needed to do more to prevent its powerlines from emitting sparks.

111. The Individual Defendants also knew that the Company did not use any wildfire prevention technologies on its T&D components, such as covered conductors, underground powerlines, composite powerlines, and non-expulsion fuses, thus increasing the risk of causing a wildfire.

112. The Individual Defendants also knew that the Company had caused wildfires on the island previously. In August 2018, a fallen powerline started a fire which covered 2,000 acres and damaged over 20 homes. Moreover, the Individual Defendants knew, or ought to have known, of previous fires caused by other electrical utility companies across the country, including Pacific, Gas & Electric Company ("PG&E") in California, PacifiCorp in Oregon, and SoCal Edison in California.

1 113. According to a 2019 filing by the Company, its 60,000 poles were
2 vulnerable due to their age and the fact that Hawaii is in a “severe wood decay
3 hazard zone.” The 2019 filing admitted that the Company had not replaced the aged
4 wooden poles and acknowledged the “serious public hazard” if the poles failed.
5 These poles, according to Maui News, were built to an “obsolete 1960’s standard”
6 and were leaning and near the end of their life span. Despite this, the Individual
7 Defendant failed to ensure the Company complied with modern day standards and
8 allowed old and decayed poles to pose a serious risk to the public. The Company
9 admitted in its 2022 PUC application that it needed funds to strengthen electrical
10 poles and that over \$6.2 million would be required for “wildfire prevention &
11 mitigation on Maui,” and that \$40 million in capital improvements/repairs would be
12 needed to help prevent wildfires more generally.

13 114. Despite the foregoing at ¶¶ 108–114, the Individual Defendants
14 drastically underfunded their wildfire-specific projects between 2019 and 2022,
15 spending only a mere \$245,000 on such projects. In fact, the Individual Defendants
16 did not seek approval to raise their rates to pay for necessary wildfire-safety
17 improvements until 2022 and refused to approve capital spending on ageing T&D
18 components and wildfire prevention for years prior. The Individual Defendants thus
19 neglected wildfire prevention and increased the risk of a wildfire occurring while, at
20 the same time, falsely and misleadingly touting that the Company was addressing
21 safety issues in its SEC filings.

22 115. The Individual Defendants were made aware of, or should have been
23 aware of, the causal link between hurricanes and wildfires caused by T&D
24 components. In 2020, researchers from the University of Hawaii and the East-West
25 Center published a report in the American Meteorological Society Journal a report
26 entitled “Fire and Rain: The Legacy of Hurricane Lane in Hawai’i.” The report found
27 that the fires on Maui and O’ahu following Hurricane Lane was not caused by
28

1 thunderstorms and lightning. Instead, the Honolulu Fire Department found that the
2 O’ahu fire was caused by power lines arcing in Hurricane Lane’s high winds.

3 116. Moreover, the Company knew that other utility companies had a
4 power shutoff system to protect against wildfires in high winds yet failed to
5 implement the same. San Diego Gas & Electric implemented such a system over a
6 decade ago to prevent causing wildfires, PG&E also implemented a power shutoff
7 system in 2019 following a fire its equipment caused, and the California PUC opened
8 Order Instituting Rulemaking (OIR) 18-12-005 to examine its rules allowing electric
9 utility companies to shutoff power lines in the event of dangerous conditions.
10 Despite this, the Individual Defendants failed to cause the Company to implement the
11 same power shutoff systems which could have prevented the devastating wildfire in
12 August 2023.

13 117. The Company announced in 2019 that they would be using drones to
14 assess fire hazards in drought-prone areas of West Maui. The Individual Defendants
15 had failed to invest sufficiently in its wildfire-prevention programs and in
16 maintaining its T&D components and instead opted to use drones for wildfire
17 identification, as opposed to prevention, as reflected by this announcement.

18 118. The Individual Defendants knew, or should have known, that the
19 Company must follow various standards to protect the public from the consequences
20 that follow from vegetation coming into contact with its T&D components, pursuant
21 to HRS § 6-73-11. Accordingly, the Company was required to maintain the areas
22 surrounding and adjacent to certain of its T&D components and ensure sufficient
23 clearance around its power lines. In addition, HRS § 6-73-14 provides that any
24 maintenance issues not specifically addressed by HRS § 6-73-11 “should be done in
25 accordance with accepted good practice for the given local conditions known at the
26 time by those responsible for the construction or maintenance.” Despite being under
27 an obligation to conform with these minimum safety standards, the Individual
28

1 Defendants failed to cause the Company to comply with those standards thus placing
2 the public at a heightened risk of wildfires caused by the Company's T&D
3 components.

4 119. The Individual Defendants knew that in the days leading up to the
5 August 2023 wildfire caused by them that Maui had been in a drought. The
6 Individual Defendants also knew that on August 7, 2023, a red flag warning was
7 issued as high wind gusts of up to 60mph were forecast across Hawaii and that,
8 coupled with the dry conditions could create critical fire conditions. Despite this, the
9 Individual Defendants failed to shut off power in advance of August 8, 2023.

10 120. At all relevant times, the Individual Defendants knew the above facts,
11 or at least should have known of them in the exercise of prudent business judgement,
12 yet failed to maintain adequate systems, controls, and programs to prevent wildfires,
13 failed to adequately maintain their T&D components, failed to comply with or cause
14 the Company to comply with minimum safety standards, and failed to prevent the
15 destructive August 2023 wildfire in Maui. Meanwhile, the Individual Defendants
16 made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Hawaiian
17 Electric's wildfire prevention and safety protocols and procedures were inadequate to
18 meet the challenges for which they were ostensibly designed; (ii) accordingly,
19 despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to Maui, the Company's
20 inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a heightened risk of
21 devastating wildfires; and (iii) as a result, the Company's public statements were
22 materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

23 **AFTERMATH**

24 **The Individual Defendants Continued**

25 **To Breach their Fiduciary Duties**

26 121. Following the Maui wildfire caused by Hawaiian Electric, the
27 Individual Defendants continued to breach their fiduciary duties to the Company. In
28

1 particular, the Individual Defendants caused the Company to remove the fallen and
 2 damaged T&D components from nearby a power station in Lahaina from around
 3 August 12, 2023.

4 122. At the time the T&D components were being removed, the Individual
 5 Defendants knew that investigators from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
 6 and Explosives (“ATF”) had not yet arrived to conduct their investigation into the
 7 origin and cause of the wildfire in the area. Moreover, the Individual Defendants
 8 knew, or should have known, that, according to the National Fire Protection
 9 Association, “the integrity of a fire scene needs to be preserved” and that “[e]**vidence**
 10 **should not be handled or removed** without documentation.”

11 123. This failure to preserve evidence was a direct breach of their fiduciary
 12 duties because the Individual Defendants knew that failing to preserve evidence
 13 could subject Hawaiian Electric to fines and penalties as the Company had discussed
 14 in 2022 the \$15 billion settlement by California utility company PG&E for starting a
 15 wildfire and failing to preserve the evidence.⁴

16 **The Impact of the Wildfire on Maui**

17 124. The wildfire caused by Hawaiian Electric had a devastating impact on
 18 Maui and its residents. As noted, *supra*, the wildfire led to at least 97 deaths and
 19 between \$4 billion to \$6 billion in losses from property damage and business
 20 interruption. It was reported that the residents of Lahaina had a matter of mere
 21

22
 23 ⁴ See *In the Matter of the Application of Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc., et*
 24 *al.*, Docket No. 2022-0135, Application at 23,
 25 [https://dms.puc.hawaii.gov/dms/DocumentViewer?pid=A1001001A22G01B11309C](https://dms.puc.hawaii.gov/dms/DocumentViewer?pid=A1001001A22G01B11309C00934)
 26 [00934](https://dms.puc.hawaii.gov/dms/DocumentViewer?pid=A1001001A22G01B11309C00934) (last accessed Dec. 7, 2023).

1 moments to escape the fires which led to many jumping into the ocean and drowning,
2 with others unable to escape and perishing in the fires.

3 125. At the time of filing this complaint, the town of Lahaina remains
4 closed to the public and West Maui accommodations started to reopen to visitors
5 slowly under a phased plan, as announced by the Hawaii Tourism Authority.

6 **DAMAGE TO THE COMPANY**

7 **Securities Class Action**

8 126. On August 24, 2023, a securities class action complaint was filed in
9 the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the
10 Company and Defendants Lau, Seu, Hazelton, and Ito. The complaint alleges
11 violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
12 “Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, in the case captioned:
13 *Bhangal v. Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc., et al.*, Case No. 3:23-cv-04332 (N.D.
14 Cal.) (“Securities Class Action”).

15 127. As a result of the wrongs complained of herein, the Individual
16 Defendants have subjected the Company to the significant cost of defending itself
17 and certain of the Company’s officers. The Company will continue to incur
18 significant sums in relation to the Securities Class Action and any liability or
19 settlement that results.

20 **Maui County Lawsuit**

21 128. On August 24, 2023, the County of Maui filed a civil complaint in
22 this Court against the Company, among other electric utility companies, for
23 negligence, gross negligence, nuisance, ultrahazardous activity, injunctive relief, and
24 trespass seeking damages for the costs that the County of Maui incurred as a result of
25 the August 2023 wildfires in the case captioned: *County of Maui v. Maui Electric*
26 *Company, et al.*, 2CCV-23-0000238 (“Maui Action”).

129. As a result of the wrongs complained of herein, the Individual Defendants have subjected the Company to the significant cost of defending itself against this Maui Action. The Company will continue to incur significant sums in relation to the Maui Action and any liability or settlement that results.

Regulatory and/or Legal Penalties

130. It has been estimated by Capstone that following the August 2023 wildfire caused by Hawaiian Electric, the Company faces potential liability in excess of \$4.9 billion, up from a previous estimate of \$3.9 billion.⁵

131. The Company also failed to preserve the wildfire evidence before investigators from the ATF had arrived, in possible violation of national guidelines. As a result, and as the Individual Defendants knew, removing evidence from the site of the wildfire could lead to massive fines being imposed against the Company, as previously happened with PG&E and SoCal Edison.

Regulatory and Governmental Investigations

132. As a result of the Individual Defendants' failures to maintain adequate safety protocols and make needed improvements to its T&D components, the Company is now subject to regulatory and governmental investigations and actions.

133. On August 31, 2023, it was announced that a governmental investigation had been opened by U.S. Representatives Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-

⁵ *Hawaiian Electric: Revised Model Shows \$4.9 in Potential Liabilities from Settlement; Maui County Increasingly Likely to Share Burden*, Capstone (Aug. 30, 2023), <https://capstonedc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/20230830-Hawaiian-Electric-Revised-Model-Shows-4.9B-in-Potential-Liabilities-from-Settlement.pdf> (last accessed Dec. 7, 2023).

WA, Chair of the Energy and Commerce Committee), Jeff Duncan (R-SC, Chair of the Energy, Climate, and Grid Security Subcommittee), and Morgan Griffith (R-VA, Chair of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee).

134. The Company may also be subject to SEC investigation and action as a result of the false and misleading statements and/or omissions made in the Company's public filings.

135. As a result of the actual and potential investigations and actions, the Company will have to expend significant sums on complying with the investigations, defending itself and certain of the Individual Defendants, and on any penalties or fines that may result.

Unjust Compensation

136. At all relevant times, the Company paid lucrative compensation to each of the Individual Defendants, totaling over \$50.4 million during the Relevant Period. The Company paid the Individual Defendants in connection with their respective roles as officers and/or directors of the Company, as follows:

	TOTAL COMPENSATION (\$)			
Defendant	2019	2020	2021	2022
Seu	-	2,465,166	2,929,665	3,811,515
Hazelton	1,753,663	1,877,488	2,442,618	1,245,484
Sekimura	1,592,036	1,807,150	1,419,571	910,425
Kimura	-	-	944,402	1,514,176
Ajello	-	89,471	108,500	125,500
Johns	116,671	175,603	184,000	201,750
Fargo	211,000	285,008	327,500	350,000
Connors	148,832	186,500	189,500	215,000
Flores	-	-	105,267	232,113
Fowler	209,720	209,500	212,500	240,000
Kane	116,283	189,500	191,000	262,333
Scilacci	157,870	196,500	198,000	231,500
Dahl	194,128	203,066	211,000	241,500

Lau	4,902,901	5,108,212	5,933,523	-
Ito	-	-	-	815,752
Pakkala	-	81,085	101,000	122,378
Taniguchi	-	-	84,299	122,378
Russell	212,500	218,000	220,000	252,000
Burke	104,883	108,500	108,500	125,500
Powell	148,832	186,500	150,815	-
Zlotnicka	-	197,932	32,225	-
Annual Total	9,720,487	13,585,181	16,093,885	11,019,304
Relevant Period Total	\$50,418,857			

137. Accordingly, as part of their respective roles, the Individual Defendants were required to, among other things, exercise due care and diligence in the management and administration of the affairs of the Company, act ethically and in compliance with all laws and regulations, maintain adequate internal controls, and conduct business in a fair and transparent manner. Further, each of the Individual Defendants had additional duties and responsibilities owed to the Company by virtue of their executive, directorial and/or committee roles, as described *infra*, for which they were compensated for.

138. However, the Individual Defendants failed to carry out their duties adequately or at all, causing harm to the Company, as alleged herein. Because the Individual Defendants failed to carry out their respective duties, the compensation they received during the Relevant Period was excessive and undeserved. As such, the Individual Defendants were unjustly enriched to the detriment of the Company.

Additional Damages

139. In addition to the damages specified above, the Company will also suffer further losses in relation to any internal investigations and amounts paid to lawyers, accountants, and investigators in connection thereto.

1 140. The Company has also been named in numerous other civil lawsuits
2 in the wake of the wildfires and is now subject to the costs of defending itself and
3 any liability or settlement that results, due to the Individual Defendants wrongdoing.

4 141. The Company will also suffer losses in relation to the Individual
5 Defendants' failure to maintain adequate internal controls, including the expense
6 involved with implementing and maintaining improved internal controls.

7 142. The Company has also suffered, and will continue to suffer, a loss of
8 reputation as a direct and proximate result of the Individual Defendants' misconduct
9 which will plague the Company's share price going forward.

10 143. Moreover, on October 2, 2023, the Company revealed in a filing to
11 the PUC that it had only \$165 million in annual general liability insurance and \$25
12 million in professional liability insurance which would cover only a small fraction of
13 the potential liability that the Company faces from the above-referenced legal and
14 regulatory actions. Thus, the Company will be unable to rely on insurance coverage
15 for the majority of damages and may have to expend significant sums from its own
16 pocket, thereby further damaging the Company.

17 **CORPORATE GOVERNANCE**

18 **Code of Conduct**

19 144. At all relevant times, the Company had in place its Code of Conduct
20 which applied to the "Employees, Officers and Directors" of the Company. The Code
21 of Conduct describes the Company's "core values, which are the fundamental
22 principles that guide the conduct of [the] business." The Code of Conduct requires
23 that everyone "to whom our Code applies must take the time to read, understand and
24 apply the provisions of our Code and report any concerns."

25 145. The Code of Conduct further provides that the "Board of Directors
26 and management also have a responsibility to maintain a company culture based on
27 integrity and compliance with all laws [...]."

1 146. In a section entitled “OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY AND
2 COMMITMENT,” the Code of Conduct states:

3 Each of us has a duty to understand and live by our Code of Conduct
4 (“Code”) and to stand by our high standard of ethics. This commitment
5 is our shared responsibility and our success depends on the important
6 decisions we make each day to uphold these obligations.

7 147. In the same section, the Code of Conduct describes its core values,
8 which include “put[ting] safety first for our teammates and community. We take
9 responsibility for our personal safety AND the safety of our team,” and “[w]e care
10 about our teammates. We care about our community and everyone in it. We care
11 about Hawai’i and its future. This means we will work together, treat each other with
12 respect and dignity, take care of our environment, and give back to our
13 communities.”

14 148. The Code of Conduct further emphasizes the importance of acting
15 with integrity and makes all employees, officers, and directors accountable for,
16 among other things: (i) “Following all laws and regulations and all Company policies
17 and procedures;” (ii) Being truthful, fair, transparent, responsible, and accurate with
18 customers, regulators, suppliers, shareholders, and other teammates;” (iii) “Protecting
19 our reputation as a trusted local company;” and (iv) “Reporting concerns and
20 violations immediately.”

21 149. The Code of Conduct also provides that “[o]ne of our responsibilities
22 under the Code is being aware of and addressing all types of risk that affect our work,
23 such as business risk, compliance risk, and reputation risk.”

24 150. In a section entitled “CODE OF ETHICS FOR SENIOR
25 FINANCIAL OFFICERS,” the Code of Conduct states:

26 **Compliance with Laws, Rules and Regulations**

27 As Senior Financial Officers, you must not only comply with applicable
28 laws, rules and regulations, you also have leadership responsibilities

1 with respect to demonstrating honesty and high ethical standards,
2 including ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest
3 between personal and professional relationships, fostering a work
4 environment that encourages employees to raise concerns and promptly
addressing employee compliance concerns identified by you.

5 **Disclosures in Periodic Reports and Other Public Communications**

6 As a public company, HEI is required to file various periodic reports
7 with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). It is
8 Company policy to make full, fair, accurate, timely and understandable
9 disclosure in compliance with all applicable laws, rules and regulations
10 in the reports and documents that HEI files with or submits to the SEC
11 and in other public communications made by HEI or its subsidiaries.
12 The Company’s Senior Financial Officers are expected to use their best
efforts to perform their duties in a manner intended to implement this
policy.

13 151. Moreover, the Code of Conduct emphasizes the importance of
14 adhering to all legal obligations, which includes maintaining accurate books and
15 records and further emphasizes the importance of reporting violations of the Code of
16 Conduct – a failure to do so could in itself be a violation of the Code of Conduct.

17 **Audit Committee Charter**

18 152. The Audit & Risk Committee Charter was in place at all relevant
19 times and sets forth additional responsibilities on the members of the Audit & Risk
20 Committee (“Audit Committee”) – consisting of Defendants Connors, Flores, and
21 Scilacci. Such additional duties include assisting the Board oversight of (i) the
22 integrity of the Company’s financial statements; (ii) the Company’s compliance with
23 legal and regulatory requirements; (iii) risk management and compliance systems and
24 structure; and (iv) the internal audit function.

25 153. More specifically, the Audit & Risk Committee Charter states that the
26 Audit Committee shall have the responsibility and authority to, *inter alia*:

1 [] Review with management and the independent auditor major issues as
2 to the adequacy of the Company's internal controls and any special audit
3 steps adopted and remediation efforts undertaken in light of material
4 control deficiencies and elicit recommendations for the improvement of
such internal controls.

5 [] Oversee the enterprise risk management program of the Company,
6 including by (a) reviewing and discussing the Company's major
7 financial risk exposures and the steps management has taken to monitor
8 and control such exposures, (b) discussing policies with respect to risk
9 assessment and risk management, including the guidelines and policies
10 governing the process by which risk assessment and risk management is
11 undertaken, and (c) periodically reporting to the Board the Committee's
discussion and findings regarding risk oversight so the entire Board can
be responsive to changes in the Company's risk profile.

12 [] Periodically review the Company's code of conduct (the "Code") and
13 oversee the Company's program and procedures to monitor compliance
14 with the Code, including meeting with the Compliance Officer to
15 discuss potential Code violations that have been reported and the results
of the Code compliance program and recommending to the Board
proposed revisions to the Code.

16 154. The Audit & Risk Committee Charter also provides that the
17 "Committee may conduct or authorize investigations into or studies of matters within
18 the Committee's scope of responsibilities."
19

20 **DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR DEFENDANTS**

21 155. As members of the Board, the Director Defendants were held to the
22 highest standards of honesty and integrity and charged with overseeing the
23 Company's business practices and policies and assuring the integrity of its financial
24 and business records.

25 156. The conduct of the Director Defendants complained of herein
26 involves a knowing and culpable violation of their obligations as directors and
27 officers of the Company, the absence of good faith on their part, and a reckless
28

1 disregard for their duties to the Company and its investors that the Director
2 Defendants were aware posed a risk of serious injury to the Company.

3 157. By reason of their positions as officers and/or directors of the
4 Company, and because of their ability to control the business and corporate affairs of
5 the Company, the Director Defendants owed the Company and its investors the
6 fiduciary obligations of trust, loyalty, and good faith. The obligations required the
7 Director Defendants to use their utmost abilities to control and manage the Company
8 in an honest and lawful manner. The Director Defendants were and are required to
9 act in furtherance of the best interests of the Company and its investors.

10 158. Each director of the Company owes to the Company and its investors
11 the fiduciary duty to exercise loyalty, good faith, and diligence in the administration
12 of the affairs of the Company and in the use and preservation of its property and
13 assets. In addition, as officers and/or directors of a publicly held company, the
14 Director Defendants had a duty to promptly disseminate accurate and truthful
15 information with regard to the Company's operations, finances, and financial
16 condition, as well as present and future business prospects, so that the market price of
17 the Company's stock would be based on truthful and accurate information.

18 159. To discharge their duties, the officers and directors of the Company
19 were required to exercise reasonable and prudent supervision over the management,
20 policies, practices, and controls of the affairs of the Company. By virtue of such
21 duties, the officers and directors of the Company were required to, among other
22 things:

23 (a) ensure that the Company complied with its legal obligations and
24 requirements, including acting only within the scope of its legal authority and
25 disseminating truthful and accurate statements to the SEC and investing
26 public;

27 (b) conduct the affairs of the Company in an efficient, businesslike
28

1 manner so as to make it possible to provide the highest quality performance of
2 its business, to avoid wasting the Company's assets, and to maximize the value
3 of the Company's stock;

4 (c) properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true
5 financial condition of the Company at any given time, including making
6 accurate statements about the Company's business prospects, and ensuring that
7 the Company maintained an adequate system of financial controls such that the
8 Company's financial reporting would be true and accurate at all times;

9 (d) remain informed as to how the Company conducted its
10 operations, and, upon receipt of notice or information of imprudent or unsound
11 conditions or practices, make reasonable inquiries in connection therewith,
12 take steps to correct such conditions or practices, and make such disclosures as
13 necessary to comply with federal and state securities laws;

14 (e) ensure that the Company was operated in a diligent, honest, and
15 prudent manner in compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws,
16 and rules and regulations; and

17 (f) ensure that all decisions were the product of independent business
18 judgment and not the result of outside influences or entrenchment motives.

19 160. Each Director Defendant, by virtue of his or her position as a director
20 and/or officer, owed to the Company and to its shareholders the fiduciary duties of
21 loyalty, good faith, and the exercise of due care and diligence in the management and
22 administration of the affairs of the Company, as well as in the use and preservation of
23 its property and assets. The conduct of the Director Defendants complained of herein
24 involves a knowing and culpable violation of their obligations as directors and
25 officers of the Company, the absence of good faith on their part, and a reckless
26 disregard for their duties to the Company and its shareholders that the Director
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1 Defendants were aware, or should have been aware, posed a risk of serious injury to
2 the Company.

3 161. The Director Defendants breached their duties of loyalty and good
4 faith by causing the Company to issue false and misleading statements concerning
5 the financial condition of the Company. As a result, the Company has expended, and
6 will continue to expend, significant sums of money related to investigations and
7 lawsuits and to structure settlements to resolve them, as detailed *supra*.

8 **DERIVATIVE AND DEMAND FUTILITY ALLEGATIONS**

9 162. Plaintiff brings this action derivatively in the right and for the benefit
10 of the Company to redress injuries suffered and to be suffered as a direct and
11 proximate result of the breaches of fiduciary duties and gross mismanagement by the
12 Director Defendants.

13 163. Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent the interests of the
14 Company and its shareholders in enforcing and prosecuting its rights and has retained
15 counsel competent and experienced in derivative litigation.

16 164. Plaintiff is a current owner of the Company stock and has
17 continuously been an owner of Company stock during all times relevant to the
18 Director Defendants' wrongful course of conduct alleged herein. Plaintiff
19 understands his obligation to hold stock throughout the duration of this action and is
20 prepared to do so.

21 165. During the illegal and wrongful course of conduct at the Company
22 and through the present, the Board consisted of the Director Defendants. Because of
23 the facts set forth throughout this Complaint, demand on the Company Board to
24 institute this action is not necessary because such a demand would have been a futile
25 and useless act.

26 166. At the time this derivative lawsuit was commenced, Hawaiian Electric
27 Industries, Inc.'s Board consisted of the following seven directors: Fargo, Seu,
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1 Connors, Flores, Fowler, Kane, and Scilacci (the “HEI Directors”). The Board of
2 Directors of Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. consisted of the following six
3 directors: Johns, Kimura, Ajello, Kip, Pakkala, and Taniguchi (the “HECO
4 Directors”) (together, the “Director Defendants”). All directors served on the Boards
5 during the period during which the Companies engaged in, authorized, or ignored the
6 wrongdoing alleged in this Complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff must show that a
7 majority of each Board, *i.e.*, four (4) of the HEI Directors, and three (3) of the HECO
8 Directors, cannot exercise independent objective judgment about whether to bring
9 this action or whether to vigorously prosecute it.

10 167. The Director Defendants either knew or should have known of the
11 false and misleading statements that were issued on the Company’s behalf and took
12 no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation.

13 168. The Director Defendants (or at the very least a majority of them)
14 cannot exercise independent objective judgment about whether to bring this action or
15 whether to vigorously prosecute this action. For the reasons that follow, and for
16 reasons detailed elsewhere in this complaint, Plaintiff has not made (and should be
17 excused from making) a pre-filing demand on the Board to initiate this action
18 because making a demand would be a futile and useless act.

19 169. Each of the Director Defendants approved and/or permitted the
20 wrongs alleged herein to have occurred and participated in efforts to conceal or
21 disguise those wrongs from the Company’s stockholders or recklessly and/or with
22 gross negligence disregarded the wrongs complained of herein and are therefore not
23 disinterested parties.

24 170. Each of the Director Defendants authorized and/or permitted the false
25 statements to be disseminated directly to the public and made available and
26 distributed to shareholders, authorized and/or permitted the issuance of various false
27 and misleading statements, and are principal beneficiaries of the wrongdoing alleged
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1 herein, and thus, could not fairly and fully prosecute such a suit even if they
2 instituted it.

3 171. Demand is also futile because all Director Defendants of both
4 Companies acted in bad faith and breached their duty of loyalty to the Companies by
5 causing the Companies to move evidence about the Maui Fire, thus failing to
6 preserve key evidence in its original location so it could be viewed and analyzed by
7 the ATF. As demonstrated in detail *supra*, the Individual Defendants caused the
8 Company to move utility poles, transformers, and other key evidence to a warehouse
9 before ATF investigators could arrive on the scene. This conduct impeded
10 investigators' ability to view the evidence in its original location, unadulterated. The
11 misconduct and evidence spoliation will likely result in substantial fines and
12 penalties being imposed on the Companies. Breaches of the duties of good faith and
13 loyalty cannot be indemnified. As a result, the Director Defendants of both
14 Companies face a substantial likelihood of personal liability for breaching such
15 duties. Demand as to all Director Defendants is thus futile.

16 172. The Director Defendants cannot consider a demand because (i) their
17 decision to operate Hawaiian Electric in violation of the law is not a protected
18 business decision and (ii) they all face a substantial likelihood of liability for
19 breaching their duties of loyalty and good faith. These defendants were either
20 informed of Hawaiian Electric's deteriorating and dangerous electric infrastructure
21 and failed to take action or are consciously violating their duty to stay informed
22 about the core business of Hawaiian Electric. Such a decision could not have been
23 an action taken in good faith and is accordingly not protected by the business
24 judgment rule. Furthermore, the conscious failure of Defendants to act in the face of
25 the overwhelming number of warnings is a breach of the duties of care and loyalty.
26 This breach subjects them to a substantial likelihood of liability. Since demand on
27 the majority of the Boards is futile, demand is excused.

1 173. Despite the Individual Defendants having knowledge of the history of
2 their own misconduct and mismanagement, the current Boards have failed and
3 refused to seek recovery for Hawaiian Electric for any of the misconduct alleged
4 herein.

5 174. Hawaiian Electric's directors and top officers pocketed millions of
6 dollars in salaries, bonuses, and directors' fees, further enriching themselves at the
7 expense of the Companies to which they owe fiduciary duties of good faith, honesty,
8 and loyalty. The Companies' leadership made an active decision to divert money
9 necessary for safety and operational protocols towards other purposes and at the
10 same time approved bonus payments and developed a corporate culture that placed
11 short-term economic gain over long-term profitability. The Individual Defendants
12 and the Boards of both Companies have caused irreparable financial and reputational
13 harm to each Company. The directors have for years consciously failed to take
14 responsibility for safeguarding the public against wildfires caused by the Company's
15 electrical equipment. Thus, neither of the Boards could exercise independent
16 objective judgment in deciding whether to bring this action or to vigorously
17 prosecute the claims alleged herein.

18 **THE HEI DIRECTORS ARE**
19 **NOT INDEPENDENT OR DISINTERESTED**

20 **Defendant Seu**

21 175. Defendant Seu not disinterested or independent, and therefore, is
22 incapable of considering demand because he, as President and CEO, is an employee
23 of the Company who derives substantially all of his income from his employment
24 with Hawaiian Electric, making him not independent. As CEO, Defendant Seu fails
25 both the NYSE's bright-line independence test and the Company's own Director
26 Independence Standards, thus Defendant Seu cannot be considered independent, as
27 admitted by the Company in its 2023 Proxy Statement filed on Schedule DEF 14A
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1 with the SEC. As such, Defendant Seu cannot independently consider any demand to
2 sue himself for breaching his fiduciary duties to the Company, because that would
3 expose him to liability and threaten his livelihood.

4 176. In addition, Defendant Seu receives lucrative compensation in
5 connection with his employment with Hawaiian Electric, having received in excess
6 of \$3.8 million in 2022 and in excess of \$9.1 million during the Relevant Period.
7 Accordingly, Defendant Seu is not independent from Defendants Fargo, Flores,
8 Fowler, and Kane as they comprise the Compensation & Human Capital
9 Management Committee (“Compensation Committee”) and are responsible for
10 evaluating and determining the compensation of executive compensation and
11 applicable benefits, including that of Defendant Seu. Because of his status as an
12 inside director, and the concomitant substantial compensation he receives, Defendant
13 Seu could not consider a demand adverse to the other Director Defendants serving on
14 the Compensation Committee who are responsible for his financial future.

15 177. Because of Defendant Seu’s participation in the gross dereliction of
16 fiduciary duties, and breaches of the duties of due care, good faith, and loyalty,
17 Defendant Seu is unable to comply with his fiduciary duties and prosecute this
18 action. Defendant Seu’s in a position of irreconcilable conflict of interest in terms of
19 the prosecution of this action and defending himself/herself in the securities fraud
20 class action lawsuit *Bhangal v. Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc.* 3:23cv04332,
21 brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Securities Class Action”).

22 178. Defendant Seu has served as a Company director since 2022. As a
23 director, Defendant Seu was required to, among other things: (i) ensure that the
24 Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and requirements; (ii)
25 properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true financial condition
26 of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to how the Company
27 conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take steps to correct any
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1 improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company was operated in a
2 diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Seu failed to fulfil
3 these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading statements to be
4 made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing the Company to
5 fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies and systems.

6 179. As a trusted Company director and senior executive officer,
7 Defendant Seu conducted little, if any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company
8 to make false and misleading statements, consciously disregarded his duties to
9 monitor such controls over reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously
10 disregarded his duties to protect corporate assets.

11 180. In addition, Defendant Seu signed, and thus personally made the false
12 and misleading statements contained in the 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022 10-K's and
13 the Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q as alleged, *supra*. For this reason, Defendant
14 Seu breached his fiduciary duties and faces a substantial likelihood of liability
15 therefor.

16 181. Defendant Seu solicited the 2022 and 2023 Proxy Statements
17 containing the false and misleading statements and was elected to the Board and had
18 his executive compensation approved as a result. Consequently, Defendant Seu
19 breached his fiduciary duties and faces a substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

20 182. According to the Company's 2023 Proxy Statement and website,
21 Defendant Seu possesses expertise in the "Utility/Energy Industry," having worked at
22 Hawaiian Electric since 2010 and served as a director at Edison Electric Institute and
23 the Electric Power Research Institute. As a result, Defendant Seu knew the hazards
24 and risks inherent to the energy sector and thus posed by Hawaiian Electric. Despite
25 this, Defendant Seu failed to ensure that the Company maintained its T&D
26 components properly, complied with minimum safety standards, engaged in wildfire
27 prevention, and that the Company operated in a safe manner. As a result of his
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1 failures as alleged herein, despite his advanced knowledge and expertise, Defendant
2 Seu faces a substantial likelihood of liability.

3 183. Defendant Seu is neither independent nor disinterested. Any demand
4 upon Defendant Seu is futile and, thus, excused.

5 **Defendant Fargo**

6 184. Defendant Fargo has served as a Company director since 2005. As a
7 director, Defendant Fargo was required to, among other things: (i) ensure that the
8 Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and requirements; (ii)
9 properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true financial condition
10 of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to how the Company
11 conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take steps to correct any
12 improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company was operated in a
13 diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Fargo failed to fulfil
14 these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading statements to be
15 made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing the Company to
16 fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies and systems.

17 185. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Fargo conducted little, if
18 any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
19 statements, consciously disregarded his duties to monitor such controls over
20 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded his duties to
21 protect corporate assets.

22 186. In addition, Defendant Fargo signed, and thus personally made the
23 false and misleading statements contained in the 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022
24 10-K's. For this reason, Defendant Fargo breached his fiduciary duties and faces and
25 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

26 187. Defendant Fargo solicited the 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023
27 Proxy Statements containing the false and misleading statements and was elected to
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1 the Board as a result. Consequently, Defendant Fargo breached his fiduciary duties
2 and faces a substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

3 188. In connection with his role as a Company director, Defendant Fargo
4 receives substantial compensation. In 2022, Defendant Fargo received a total
5 compensation package in excess of \$350,000, as detailed *supra*. With such lucrative
6 compensation, Defendant Fargo cannot reasonably and objectively consider a
7 demand to sue the Board who control his continued compensation, including himself.

8 189. Defendant Fargo also has a longstanding relationship with Defendant
9 Ajello. Defendant Fargo currently serves as a Senior Advisor at SKAI Ventures.
10 Meanwhile, Defendant Ajello has served on the Board of SKAI Ventures since 2015.
11 Thus, Defendants Fargo and Ajello have worked together and built a business
12 relationship while at SKAI Ventures. As a result of the foregoing, Defendants Fargo
13 and Ajello are incapable of considering a demand to sue each other.

14 190. Defendant Fargo is neither independent nor disinterested. Any
15 demand upon Defendant Fargo is futile and, thus, excused.

16 **Defendant Connors**

17 191. Defendant Connors has served as a Company director since 2019. As
18 a director, Defendant Connors was required to, among other things: (i) ensure that the
19 Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and requirements; (ii)
20 properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true financial condition
21 of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to how the Company
22 conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take steps to correct any
23 improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company was operated in a
24 diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Connors failed to fulfil
25 these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading statements to be
26 made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing the Company to
27 fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies and systems.

1 192. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Connors conducted little, if
2 any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
3 statements, consciously disregarded her duties to monitor such controls over
4 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded her duties to
5 protect corporate assets.

6 193. During the Relevant Period, Defendant Connors served as a member
7 of HEI's Audit Committee and had certain additional duties by virtue thereof. Such
8 additional duties include assisting the Board oversight of (i) the integrity of the
9 Company's financial statements; (ii) the Company's compliance with legal and
10 regulatory requirements; (iii) risk management and compliance systems and
11 structure; and (iv) the internal audit function. Despite this, Defendant Connors failed
12 to fulfil these additional duties by permitting the false and misleading statements to
13 be made, failing to ensure the Company's compliance with legal and regulatory
14 safety requirements, and not identifying and addressing the risks to the Company and
15 its reputation as a result of the wrongdoing as alleged herein. Defendant Connors
16 completely abandoned her directorial and Audit Committee duties and faces a
17 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

18 194. In addition, Defendant Connors signed, and thus personally made the
19 false and misleading statements contained in the 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022 10-K's.
20 For this reason, Defendant Connors breached her fiduciary duties and faces and
21 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

22 195. Defendant Connors solicited the 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023
23 Proxy Statements containing the false and misleading statements and was elected to
24 the Board as a result. Consequently, Defendant Connors breached her fiduciary
25 duties and faces a substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

26 196. In connection with her role as a Company director, Defendant
27 Connors receives substantial compensation. In 2022, Defendant Connors received a
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1 total compensation package in excess of \$215,000, as detailed *supra*. With such
2 lucrative compensation, Defendant Connors cannot reasonably and objectively
3 consider a demand to sue the Board who control her continued compensation,
4 including herself.

5 197. According to the Company's 2023 Proxy Statement, the Company
6 and its subsidiaries made charitable contributions to nonprofit organizations where
7 Defendant Connors serves as executive officer. As a result, Defendant Connors is not
8 independent as she could not reasonably consider a demand to sue the directors of the
9 Company from which her nonprofit receives donations and risk not receiving those
10 similar contributions again in the future.

11 198. Defendant Connors is neither independent nor disinterested. Any
12 demand upon Defendant Connors is futile and, thus, excused.

13 **Defendant Flores**

14 199. Defendant Flores has served as a Company director since 2021. As a
15 director, Defendant Flores was required to, among other things: (i) ensure that the
16 Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and requirements; (ii)
17 properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true financial condition
18 of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to how the Company
19 conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take steps to correct any
20 improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company was operated in a
21 diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Flores failed to fulfil
22 these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading statements to be
23 made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing the Company to
24 fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies and systems.

25 200. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Flores conducted little, if
26 any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
27 statements, consciously disregarded her duties to monitor such controls over
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1 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded her duties to
2 protect corporate assets.

3 201. During the Relevant Period, Defendant Flores served as a member of
4 HEI's Audit Committee and had certain additional duties by virtue thereof. Such
5 additional duties include assisting the Board oversight of (i) the integrity of the
6 Company's financial statements; (ii) the Company's compliance with legal and
7 regulatory requirements; (iii) risk management and compliance systems and
8 structure; and (iv) the internal audit function. Despite this, Defendant Flores failed to
9 fulfil these additional duties by permitting the false and misleading statements to be
10 made, failing to ensure the Company's compliance with legal and regulatory safety
11 requirements, and not identifying and addressing the risks to the Company and its
12 reputation as a result of the wrongdoing as alleged herein. Defendant Flores
13 completely abandoned her directorial and Audit Committee duties and faces a
14 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

15 202. In addition, Defendant Flores signed, and thus personally made the
16 false and misleading statements contained in the 2021 and 2022 10-K's. For this
17 reason, Defendant Flores breached her fiduciary duties and faces a substantial
18 likelihood of liability therefor.

19 203. Defendant Flores solicited the 2022 and 2023 Proxy Statements
20 containing the false and misleading statements and was elected to the Board as a
21 result. Consequently, Defendant Flores breached her fiduciary duties and faces a
22 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

23 204. In connection with her role as a Company director, Defendant Flores
24 receives substantial compensation. In 2022, Defendant Flores received a total
25 compensation package in excess of \$232,113, as detailed *supra*. With such lucrative
26 compensation, Defendant Flores cannot reasonably and objectively consider a
27 demand to sue the Board who control her continued compensation, including herself.
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1 205. Defendant Flores is neither independent nor disinterested. Any
2 demand upon Defendant Flores is futile and, thus, excused.

3 **Defendant Fowler**

4 206. Defendant Fowler has served as a Company director since 2009. As a
5 director, Defendant Fowler was required to, among other things: (i) ensure that the
6 Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and requirements; (ii)
7 properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true financial condition
8 of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to how the Company
9 conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take steps to correct any
10 improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company was operated in a
11 diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Fowler failed to fulfil
12 these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading statements to be
13 made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing the Company to
14 fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies and systems.

15 207. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Fowler conducted little, if
16 any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
17 statements, consciously disregarded her duties to monitor such controls over
18 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded her duties to
19 protect corporate assets.

20 208. In addition, Defendant Fowler signed, and thus personally made the
21 false and misleading statements contained in the 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022
22 10-K's. For this reason, Defendant Fowler breached her fiduciary duties and faces
23 and substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

24 209. Defendant Fowler solicited the 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023
25 Proxy Statements containing the false and misleading statements and was elected to
26 the Board as a result. Consequently, Defendant Fowler breached her fiduciary duties
27 and faces a substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

1 210. In connection with her role as a Company director, Defendant Fowler
2 receives substantial compensation. In 2022, Defendant Fowler received a total
3 compensation package in excess of \$240,000, as detailed *supra*. With such lucrative
4 compensation, Defendant Fowler cannot reasonably and objectively consider a
5 demand to sue the Board who control her continued compensation, including herself.

6 211. According to the Company's 2023 Proxy Statement and website,
7 Defendant Fowler possesses expertise in the "Utility/Energy Industry," having
8 previously served on the Board of Portland General Electric. As a result, Defendant
9 Fowler knew the hazards and risks inherent to the energy sector and thus posed by
10 Hawaiian Electric. Despite this, Defendant Fowler failed to ensure that the Company
11 maintained its T&D components properly, complied with minimum safety standards,
12 engaged in wildfire prevention, and that the Company operated in a safe manner. As
13 a result of her failures as alleged herein, despite her advanced knowledge and
14 expertise, Defendant Fowler faces a substantial likelihood of liability.

15 212. Defendant Fowler is neither independent nor disinterested. Any
16 demand upon Defendant Fowler is futile and, thus, excused.

17 **Defendant Kane**

18 213. Defendant Kane has served as a Company director since 2019. As a
19 director, Defendant Kane was required to, among other things: (i) ensure that the
20 Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and requirements; (ii)
21 properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true financial condition
22 of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to how the Company
23 conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take steps to correct any
24 improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company was operated in a
25 diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Kane failed to fulfil
26 these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading statements to be
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1 made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing the Company to
2 fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies and systems.

3 214. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Kane conducted little, if
4 any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
5 statements, consciously disregarded his duties to monitor such controls over
6 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded his duties to
7 protect corporate assets.

8 215. In addition, Defendant Kane signed, and thus personally made the
9 false and misleading statements contained in the 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022
10 10-K's. For this reason, Defendant Kane breached his fiduciary duties and faces and
11 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

12 216. Defendant Kane solicited the 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 Proxy
13 Statements containing the false and misleading statements and was elected to the
14 Board as a result. Consequently, Defendant Kane breached his fiduciary duties and
15 faces a substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

16 217. In connection with his role as a Company director, Defendant Kane
17 receives substantial compensation. In 2022, Defendant Kane received a total
18 compensation package in excess of \$262,333, as detailed *supra*. With such lucrative
19 compensation, Defendant Kane cannot reasonably and objectively consider a demand
20 to sue the Board who control his continued compensation, including himself.

21 218. According to the Company's 2023 Proxy Statement, the Company
22 and its subsidiaries made charitable contributions to nonprofit organizations where
23 Defendant Kane serves as executive officer. As a result, Defendant Kane is not
24 independent as he could not reasonably consider a demand to sue the directors of the
25 Company from which his nonprofit receives donations and risk not receiving those
26 similar contributions again in the future.

1 219. Defendant Kane also has a longstanding relationship with Defendant
2 Kimura. Defendant Kane is currently a Trustee of Kamehameha Schools, having held
3 this position since 2009. Meanwhile, Defendant Kimura presently serves on the
4 Audit Committee of Kamehameha Schools. Thus, Defendants Kane and Kimura have
5 worked together and built a business relationship while at Kamehameha Schools. As
6 a result of the foregoing, Defendants Kane and Kimura are incapable of considering a
7 demand to sue each other.

8 220. Defendant Kane is neither independent nor disinterested. Any demand
9 upon Defendant Kane is futile and, thus, excused.

10 **Defendant Scilacci**

11 221. Defendant Scilacci has served as a Company director since 2019. As a
12 director, Defendant Scilacci was required to, among other things: (i) ensure that the
13 Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and requirements; (ii)
14 properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true financial condition
15 of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to how the Company
16 conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take steps to correct any
17 improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company was operated in a
18 diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Scilacci failed to fulfil
19 these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading statements to be
20 made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing the Company to
21 fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies and systems.

22 222. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Scilacci conducted little, if
23 any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
24 statements, consciously disregarded his duties to monitor such controls over
25 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded his duties to
26 protect corporate assets.

1 223. During the Relevant Period, Defendant Scilacci served as the Chair of
2 HEI's Audit Committee and had certain additional duties by virtue thereof. Such
3 additional duties include assisting the Board oversight of (i) the integrity of the
4 Company's financial statements; (ii) the Company's compliance with legal and
5 regulatory requirements; (iii) risk management and compliance systems and
6 structure; and (iv) the internal audit function. Despite this, Defendant Scilacci failed
7 to fulfil these additional duties by permitting the false and misleading statements to
8 be made, failing to ensure the Company's compliance with legal and regulatory
9 safety requirements, and not identifying and addressing the risks to the Company and
10 its reputation as a result of the wrongdoing as alleged herein. Defendant Scilacci
11 completely abandoned his directorial and Audit Committee duties and faces a
12 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

13 224. In addition, Defendant Scilacci signed, and thus personally made the
14 false and misleading statements contained in the 2019, 2020, 2021, and 10-K's. For
15 this reason, Defendant Scilacci breached his fiduciary duties and faces and
16 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

17 225. Defendant Scilacci solicited the 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023
18 Proxy Statements containing the false and misleading statements and was elected to
19 the Board as a result. Consequently, Defendant Scilacci breached his fiduciary duties
20 and faces a substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

21 226. In connection with his role as a Company director, Defendant Scilacci
22 receives substantial compensation. In 2022, Defendant Scilacci received a total
23 compensation package in excess of \$231,500, as detailed *supra*. With such lucrative
24 compensation, Defendant Scilacci cannot reasonably and objectively consider a
25 demand to sue the Board who control his continued compensation, including himself.

26 227. According to the Company's 2023 Proxy Statement and website,
27 Defendant Scilacci possesses expertise in the "Utility/Energy Industry," having
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1 previously held positions within Southern California Edison, including Senior Vice
2 President and CFO. Defendant Scilacci is reputed as “one of the top CFOs in the
3 electric utility sector.” As a result, Defendant Scilacci knew the hazards and risks
4 inherent to the energy sector and thus posed by Hawaiian Electric. Despite this,
5 Defendant Scilacci failed to ensure that the Company maintained its T&D
6 components properly, complied with minimum safety standards, engaged in wildfire
7 prevention, and that the Company operated in a safe manner. As a result of his
8 failures as alleged herein, despite his advanced knowledge and expertise, Defendant
9 Scilacci faces a substantial likelihood of liability.

10 228. Defendant Scilacci is neither independent nor disinterested. Any
11 demand upon Defendant Scilacci is futile and, thus, excused.

12 **THE HECO DIRECTORS ARE**
13 **NOT INDEPENDENT OR DISINTERESTED**

14 **Defendant Kimura**

15 229. Defendant Kimura not disinterested or independent, and therefore, is
16 incapable of considering demand because she, as President and CEO, is an employee
17 of the Company who derives substantially all of his income from his employment
18 with Hawaiian Electric, making her not independent. As CEO, Defendant Kimura
19 fails both the NYSE’s bright-line independence test and the Company’s own Director
20 Independence Standards, as admitted by the Company in Hawaiian Electric’s Exhibit
21 99.1 attached to its 2023 Annual Report. As such, Defendant Kimura cannot
22 independently consider any demand to sue herself for breaching his fiduciary duties
23 to the Company, because that would expose her to liability and threaten his
24 livelihood.

25 230. In addition, Defendant Kimura receives lucrative compensation in
26 connection with her employment with the Company, having received in excess of
27 \$1.5 million in 2022. Accordingly, Defendant Kimura is not independent from
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1 Defendants Fargo, Flores, Fowler, and Kane as they comprise the Compensation &
2 Human Capital Management Committee (“Compensation Committee”) and are
3 responsible for evaluating and determining the compensation of executive
4 compensation and applicable benefits, including that of Defendant Kimura. Because
5 of her status as an inside director, and the concomitant substantial compensation she
6 receives, Defendant Kimura could not consider a demand adverse to the other
7 Director Defendants serving on the Compensation Committee who are responsible
8 for her financial future.

9 231. Defendant Kimura has served as a Company director since 2022. As a
10 director, Defendant Kimura was required to, among other things: (i) ensure that the
11 Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and requirements; (ii)
12 properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true financial condition
13 of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to how the Company
14 conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take steps to correct any
15 improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company was operated in a
16 diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Kimura failed to fulfil
17 these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading statements to be
18 made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing the Company to
19 fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies and systems.

20 232. As a trusted Company director and senior executive officer,
21 Defendant Kimura conducted little, if any, oversight of the scheme to cause the
22 Company to make false and misleading statements, consciously disregarded her
23 duties to monitor such controls over reporting and engagement in the scheme, and
24 consciously disregarded her duties to protect corporate assets.

25 233. In addition, Defendant Kimura signed, and thus personally made the
26 false and misleading statements contained in the 2021 and 2022 10-K’s and the
27 Quarterly Reports filed on Form 10-Q as alleged, *supra*. For this reason, Defendant
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1 Kimura breached her fiduciary duties and faces a substantial likelihood of liability
2 therefor.

3 234. Defendant Kimura also has a longstanding relationship with
4 Defendant Kane. Defendant Kimura presently serves on the Audit Committee of
5 Kamehameha Schools. Meanwhile, Defendant Kane is currently a Trustee of
6 Kamehameha Schools, having held this position since 2009. Thus, Defendants
7 Kimura and Kane have worked together and built a business relationship while at
8 Kamehameha Schools. As a result of the foregoing, Defendants Kimura and Kane are
9 incapable of considering a demand to sue each other.

10 235. Additionally, Defendant Kimura has worked at the Company since
11 2004, having held many positions over the years, thus gaining significant experience
12 and knowledge of the electric utility sector. As a result, Defendant Kimura knew the
13 hazards and risks inherent to the energy sector and thus posed by Hawaiian Electric.
14 Despite this, Defendant Kimura failed to ensure that the Company maintained its
15 T&D components properly, complied with minimum safety standards, engaged in
16 wildfire prevention, and that the Company operated in a safe manner. As a result of
17 her failures as alleged herein, despite her advanced knowledge and expertise,
18 Defendant Kimura faces a substantial likelihood of liability.

19 236. Because of Defendant Kimura's participation in the gross dereliction
20 of fiduciary duties, and breaches of the duties of due care, good faith, and loyalty,
21 Defendant Kimura is unable to comply with her fiduciary duties and prosecute this
22 action.

23 237. Defendant Kimura is neither independent nor disinterested. Any
24 demand upon Defendant Kimura is futile and, thus, excused.

25 **Defendant Johns**

26 238. Defendant Johns has served as a Company director since 2005 and
27 Chairman since 2020. As a director, Defendant Johns was required to, among other
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1 things: (i) ensure that the Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations
2 and requirements; (ii) properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the
3 true financial condition of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to
4 how the Company conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take
5 steps to correct any improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company
6 was operated in a diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant
7 Johns failed to fulfil these duties by making and/or permitting the false and
8 misleading statements to be made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting
9 or causing the Company to fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention
10 strategies and systems.

11 239. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Johns conducted little, if
12 any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
13 statements, consciously disregarded his duties to monitor such controls over
14 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded his duties to
15 protect corporate assets.

16 240. During the Relevant Period, Defendant Johns served as Chair of
17 HECO's Audit Committee and had certain additional duties by virtue thereof. Such
18 additional duties include assisting the Board oversight of (i) the integrity of the
19 Company's financial statements; (ii) the Company's compliance with legal and
20 regulatory requirements; (iii) risk management and compliance systems and
21 structure; and (iv) the internal audit function. Despite this, Defendant Johns failed to
22 fulfil these additional duties by permitting the false and misleading statements to be
23 made, failing to ensure the Company's compliance with legal and regulatory safety
24 requirements, and not identifying and addressing the risks to the Company and its
25 reputation as a result of the wrongdoing as alleged herein. Defendant Johns
26 completely abandoned his directorial and Audit Committee duties and faces a
27 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

1 241. In addition, Defendant Johns signed, and thus personally made the
2 false and misleading statements contained in the 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022 10-K's.
3 For this reason, Defendant Johns breached his fiduciary duties and faces and
4 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

5 242. In connection with his role as a Company director, Defendant Johns
6 receives substantial compensation. In 2022, Defendant Johns received a total
7 compensation package in excess of \$201,000, as detailed *supra*. With such lucrative
8 compensation, Defendant Johns cannot reasonably and objectively consider a
9 demand to sue the Board who control his continued compensation, including himself.

10 243. Defendant Johns is neither independent nor disinterested. Any
11 demand upon Defendant Johns is futile and, thus, excused.

12 **Defendant Ajello**

13 244. Defendant Ajello has served as a Company director since 2020. As a
14 director, Defendant Ajello was required to, among other things: (i) ensure that the
15 Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and requirements; (ii)
16 properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true financial condition
17 of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to how the Company
18 conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take steps to correct any
19 improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company was operated in a
20 diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Ajello failed to fulfil
21 these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading statements to be
22 made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing the Company to
23 fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies and systems.

24 245. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Ajello conducted little, if
25 any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
26 statements, consciously disregarded his duties to monitor such controls over
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1 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded his duties to
2 protect corporate assets.

3 246. During the Relevant Period, Defendant Ajello served as a member of
4 HECO's Audit Committee and had certain additional duties by virtue thereof. Such
5 additional duties include assisting the Board oversight of (i) the integrity of the
6 Company's financial statements; (ii) the Company's compliance with legal and
7 regulatory requirements; (iii) risk management and compliance systems and
8 structure; and (iv) the internal audit function. Despite this, Defendant Johns failed to
9 fulfil these additional duties by permitting the false and misleading statements to be
10 made, failing to ensure the Company's compliance with legal and regulatory safety
11 requirements, and not identifying and addressing the risks to the Company and its
12 reputation as a result of the wrongdoing as alleged herein. Defendant Ajello
13 completely abandoned his directorial and Audit Committee duties and faces a
14 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

15 247. In addition, Defendant Ajello signed, and thus personally made the
16 false and misleading statements contained in the 2020, 2021, and 2022 10-K's. For
17 this reason, Defendant Ajello breached his fiduciary duties and faces a substantial
18 likelihood of liability therefor.

19 248. In connection with his role as a Company director, Defendant Ajello
20 receives substantial compensation. In 2022, Defendant Ajello received a total
21 compensation package of \$125,500, as detailed *supra*. With such lucrative
22 compensation, Defendant Ajello cannot reasonably and objectively consider a
23 demand to sue the Board who control his continued compensation, including himself.

24 249. Defendant Ajello also has a longstanding relationship with Defendant
25 Fargo. Defendant Ajello has served on the Board of SKAI Ventures since 2015.
26 Meanwhile, Defendant Fargo also currently serves as a Senior Advisor at SKAI
27 Ventures. Thus, Defendants Ajello and Fargo have worked together and built a
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1 business relationship while at SKAI Ventures. As a result of the foregoing,
2 Defendants Ajello and Fargo are incapable of considering a demand to sue each
3 other.

4 250. Additionally, Defendant Ajello has previously served as Senior Vice
5 President and CFO of Portland General Electric, President of Resilient Energy
6 Solutions LLC, and held other senior roles at Reliant Energy, Inc, thus gaining
7 significant experience within the energy utility sector. As a result, Defendant Ajello
8 knew the hazards and risks inherent to the energy sector and thus posed by Hawaiian
9 Electric. Despite this, Defendant Ajello failed to ensure that the Company maintained
10 its T&D components properly, complied with minimum safety standards, engaged in
11 wildfire prevention, and that the Company operated in a safe manner. As a result of
12 his failures as alleged herein, despite his advanced knowledge and expertise,
13 Defendant Ajello faces a substantial likelihood of liability.

14 251. Defendant Ajello is neither independent nor disinterested. Any
15 demand upon Defendant Ajello is futile and, thus, excused.

16 **Defendant Kipp**

17 252. Defendant Kipp has served as a Company director since January
18 2023. As a director, Defendant Kipp was required to, among other things: (i) ensure
19 that the Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and
20 requirements; (ii) properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true
21 financial condition of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to
22 how the Company conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take
23 steps to correct any improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company
24 was operated in a diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Kipp
25 failed to fulfil these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading
26 statements to be made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing
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1 the Company to fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies
2 and systems.

3 253. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Kipp conducted little, if
4 any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
5 statements, consciously disregarded her duties to monitor such controls over
6 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded her duties to
7 protect corporate assets.

8 254. During the Relevant Period, Defendant Kipp served as a member of
9 HECO's Audit Committee and had certain additional duties by virtue thereof. Such
10 additional duties include assisting the Board oversight of (i) the integrity of the
11 Company's financial statements; (ii) the Company's compliance with legal and
12 regulatory requirements; (iii) risk management and compliance systems and
13 structure; and (iv) the internal audit function. Despite this, Defendant Kipp failed to
14 fulfil these additional duties by permitting the false and misleading statements to be
15 made, failing to ensure the Company's compliance with legal and regulatory safety
16 requirements, and not identifying and addressing the risks to the Company and its
17 reputation as a result of the wrongdoing as alleged herein. Defendant Kipp
18 completely abandoned her directorial and Audit Committee duties and faces a
19 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

20 255. In addition, Defendant Kipp signed, and thus personally made the
21 false and misleading statements contained in the 2022 10-K. For this reason,
22 Defendant Kipp breached her fiduciary duties and faces a substantial likelihood of
23 liability therefor.

24 256. Additionally, Defendant Kipp has previously served as President and
25 CEO of Puget Sound Energy, Inc., President and CEO of El Paso Electric Company,
26 and held roles within the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, thus gaining
27 significant experience within the energy utility sector. As a result, Defendant Kipp
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1 knew the hazards and risks inherent to the energy sector and thus posed by Hawaiian
2 Electric. Despite this, Defendant Kipp failed to ensure that the Company maintained
3 its T&D components properly, complied with minimum safety standards, engaged in
4 wildfire prevention, and that the Company operated in a safe manner. As a result of
5 her failures as alleged herein, despite her advanced knowledge and expertise,
6 Defendant Kipp faces a substantial likelihood of liability.

7 257. In connection with her role as a Company director, Defendant Kipp
8 receives substantial compensation. With such lucrative compensation, Defendant
9 Kipp cannot reasonably and objectively consider a demand to sue the Board who
10 control her continued compensation, including herself.

11 258. Defendant Kipp is neither independent nor disinterested. Any demand
12 upon Defendant Kipp is futile and, thus, excused.

13 **Defendant Pakkala**

14 259. Defendant Pakkala has served as a Company director since 2020. As a
15 director, Defendant Pakkala was required to, among other things: (i) ensure that the
16 Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and requirements; (ii)
17 properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true financial condition
18 of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to how the Company
19 conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take steps to correct any
20 improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company was operated in a
21 diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant Pakkala failed to fulfil
22 these duties by making and/or permitting the false and misleading statements to be
23 made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting or causing the Company to
24 fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention strategies and systems.

25 260. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Pakkala conducted little, if
26 any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
27 statements, consciously disregarded her duties to monitor such controls over
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1 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded her duties to
2 protect corporate assets.

3 261. During the Relevant Period, Defendant Pakkala served as a member
4 of HECO's Audit Committee and had certain additional duties by virtue thereof.
5 Such additional duties include assisting the Board oversight of (i) the integrity of the
6 Company's financial statements; (ii) the Company's compliance with legal and
7 regulatory requirements; (iii) risk management and compliance systems and
8 structure; and (iv) the internal audit function. Despite this, Defendant Pakkala failed
9 to fulfil these additional duties by permitting the false and misleading statements to
10 be made, failing to ensure the Company's compliance with legal and regulatory
11 safety requirements, and not identifying and addressing the risks to the Company and
12 its reputation as a result of the wrongdoing as alleged herein. Defendant Pakkala
13 completely abandoned her directorial and Audit Committee duties and faces a
14 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

15 262. In addition, Defendant Pakkala signed, and thus personally made the
16 false and misleading statements contained in the 2020, 2021, and 2022 10-K's. For
17 this reason, Defendant Pakkala breached her fiduciary duties and faces and
18 substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

19 263. In connection with her role as a Company director, Defendant Pakkala
20 receives substantial compensation. In 2022, Defendant Pakkala received a total
21 compensation package in excess of \$122,000, as detailed *supra*. With such lucrative
22 compensation, Defendant Pakkala cannot reasonably and objectively consider a
23 demand to sue the Board who control her continued compensation, including herself.

24 264. According to the Company's Exhibit 99.1 attached to the 2023
25 Annual Report, entities in which Defendant Pakkala or her family members have an
26 ownership interest engaged in business with American Savings Bank – a wholly
27 owned subsidiary of the Company in which Defendants Seu, Dahl, and Otani serve
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1 on the Board. As a result of this business engagement, Defendant Pakkala is not
2 independent from the Company nor Defendants Seu, Dahl, and Otani and could not
3 reasonably consider a demand to sue these directors.

4 265. Defendant Pakkala is neither independent nor disinterested. Any
5 demand upon Defendant Pakkala is futile and, thus, excused.

6 **Defendant Taniguchi**

7 266. Defendant Taniguchi has served as a Company director since 2021.
8 As a director, Defendant Taniguchi was required to, among other things: (i) ensure
9 that the Company complied with its legal and regulatory obligations and
10 requirements; (ii) properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true
11 financial condition of the Company at any given time; (iii) remain informed as to
12 how the Company conducted its operations, make reasonable inquiries, and take
13 steps to correct any improper conditions or practices; and (iv) ensure the Company
14 was operated in a diligent, honest, and prudent manner. Despite this, Defendant
15 Taniguchi failed to fulfil these duties by making and/or permitting the false and
16 misleading statements to be made, not correcting those statements, and by permitting
17 or causing the Company to fail to maintain adequate controls and wildfire prevention
18 strategies and systems.

19 267. As a trusted Company director, Defendant Taniguchi conducted little,
20 if any, oversight of the scheme to cause the Company to make false and misleading
21 statements, consciously disregarded his duties to monitor such controls over
22 reporting and engagement in the scheme, and consciously disregarded his duties to
23 protect corporate assets.

24 268. During the Relevant Period, Defendant Taniguchi served as a member
25 of HECO's Audit Committee and had certain additional duties by virtue thereof.
26 Such additional duties include assisting the Board oversight of (i) the integrity of the
27 Company's financial statements; (ii) the Company's compliance with legal and
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1 regulatory requirements; (iii) risk management and compliance systems and
2 structure; and (iv) the internal audit function. Despite this, Defendant Taniguchi
3 failed to fulfil these additional duties by permitting the false and misleading
4 statements to be made, failing to ensure the Company's compliance with legal and
5 regulatory safety requirements, and not identifying and addressing the risks to the
6 Company and its reputation as a result of the wrongdoing as alleged herein.
7 Defendant Taniguchi completely abandoned his directorial and Audit Committee
8 duties and faces a substantial likelihood of liability therefor.

9 269. In addition, Defendant Taniguchi signed, and thus personally made
10 the false and misleading statements contained in the 2021 and 2022 10-K's. For this
11 reason, Defendant Taniguchi breached his fiduciary duties and faces a substantial
12 likelihood of liability therefor.

13 270. In connection with his role as a Company director, Defendant
14 Taniguchi receives substantial compensation. In 2022, Defendant Taniguchi received
15 a total compensation package in excess of \$122,000, as detailed *supra*. With such
16 lucrative compensation, Defendant Taniguchi cannot reasonably and objectively
17 consider a demand to sue the Board who control his continued compensation,
18 including himself.

19 271. Defendant Taniguchi is neither independent nor disinterested. Any
20 demand upon Defendant Taniguchi is futile and, thus, excused.

21 **Additional Reasons Demand is Futile**

22 272. The Company has been and will continue to be exposed to significant
23 losses due to the wrongdoing complained of herein, yet the Director Defendants have
24 not caused the Company to take action to recover for the Company the damages it
25 has suffered and will continue to suffer thereby.

26 273. The Company, at all material times, had its Code of Conduct and
27 related corporate governance policies which required each of the Director Defendants
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1 to maintain the highest standards of honesty and integrity, particularly in relation to
2 accurate and truthful public disclosures. Yet, despite this Code of Conduct, and other
3 relevant policies and committee charters, each of the Director Defendants failed to
4 ensure that the Company upheld high standards of integrity, misrepresented facts to
5 the investing public, and failed to report any concerns, or investigate any misconduct,
6 let alone commence litigation against the Individual Defendants.

7 274. In violation of the Code of Conduct, the Director Defendants
8 conducted little, if any, oversight of the Company's engagement in the Individual
9 Defendants' scheme to cause the Company to issue materially false and misleading
10 statements to the public and to facilitate and disguise the Individual Defendants'
11 violations of law, including breaches of fiduciary duty, waste of corporate assets, and
12 unjust enrichment. In violation of the Code of Conduct, the Director Defendants
13 failed to comply with laws and regulations, failed to maintain the accuracy of
14 company records, public reports, and communications, and failed to uphold the
15 responsibilities related thereto. Thus, the Director Defendants face a substantial
16 likelihood of liability and demand is futile as to them.

17 275. The Director Defendants received, and continue to receive, substantial
18 salaries, bonuses, payments, benefits, and other emoluments by virtue of their
19 membership on the Board. They have benefitted from the wrongs alleged herein and
20 have engaged therein to preserve their positions of control and the prerequisites
21 thereof and are incapable of exercising independent objective judgment in deciding
22 whether to bring this action.

23 276. The Individual Defendants' conduct described herein and summarized
24 above could not have been the product of legitimate business judgment as it was
25 based on bad faith and intentional, reckless, or disloyal misconduct. Thus, none of
26 the Director Defendants can claim exculpation from their violations of duty pursuant
27 to the Company's charter (to the extent such a provision exists). As a majority of the
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1 Director Defendants face a substantial likelihood of liability, they are self-interested
2 in the transactions challenged herein and cannot be presumed to be capable of
3 exercising independent and disinterested judgment about whether to pursue this
4 action on behalf of the shareholders of the Company. Accordingly, demand is
5 excused as being futile.

6 277. Publicly traded companies, such as Hawaiian Electric, typically carry
7 director and officer liability insurance from which the Company could potentially
8 recover some or all of its losses. However, such insurance typically contains an
9 “insured vs. insured” disclaimer that will foreclose a recovery from the insurers if the
10 Individual Defendants sue each other to recover the Company’s damages. If no such
11 insurance is carried, then the Director Defendants will not cause the Company to sue
12 the Individual Defendants named herein, since, if they did, they would face a large
13 uninsured individual liability. Accordingly, demand is futile in that event.

14 278. Accordingly, each of the Director Defendants, and at least a majority
15 of them, cannot reasonably consider a demand with the requisite disinterestedness
16 and independence. Indeed, any demand upon the board is futile and, thus, excused.

17 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

18 **(Against The Individual Defendants for Breach of Fiduciary Duties)**

19 279. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-allege each and every
20 allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein.

21 280. The Individual Defendants owe the Company fiduciary obligations.
22 By reason of their fiduciary relationships, the Individual Defendants owed and owe
23 the Company the highest obligation of good faith, fair dealing, loyalty, and due care.

24 281. The Individual Defendants violated and breached their fiduciary
25 duties of care, loyalty, reasonable inquiry, and good faith.

26 282. The Individual Defendants engaged in a sustained and systematic
27 failure to properly exercise their fiduciary duties. Among other things, the Individual
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1 Defendants breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith by allowing the
2 Company to improperly misrepresent the Company's publicly reported financials.
3 These actions could not have been a good faith exercise of prudent business
4 judgment to protect and promote the Company's corporate interests.

5 283. As a direct and proximate result of the Individual Defendants' failure
6 to perform their fiduciary obligations, the Company has sustained significant
7 damages. As a result of the misconduct alleged herein, the Individual Defendants are
8 liable to the Company.

9 284. As a direct and proximate result of the Individual Defendants' breach
10 of their fiduciary duties, the Company has suffered damage, not only monetarily, but
11 also to its corporate image and goodwill. Such damage includes, among other things,
12 costs associated with defending securities lawsuits, severe damage to the share price
13 of the Company, resulting in an increased cost of capital, the waste of corporate
14 assets, and reputational harm.

15 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

16 **(Against the Individual Defendants for Waste of Corporate Assets)**

17 285. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every
18 allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein.

19 286. The wrongful conduct alleged regarding the issuance of false and
20 misleading statements was continuous, connected, and on-going throughout the
21 Relevant Period. It resulted in continuous, connected, and ongoing harm to the
22 Company.

23 287. As a result of the misconduct described above, the Individual
24 Defendants wasted corporate assets by, *inter alia*: (i) paying excessive compensation
25 and bonuses to certain of its executive officers; (ii) awarding self-interested stock
26 options to certain officers and directors; and (iii) incurring potentially millions of
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1 dollars of legal liability and/or legal costs to defend the Individual Defendants'
2 unlawful actions.

3 288. As a result of the waste of corporate assets, the Individual Defendants
4 are liable to the Company.

5 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**

6 **(Against The Individual Defendants for Unjust Enrichment)**

7 289. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every
8 allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein.

9 290. By their wrongful acts, violations of law, and inaccurate and
10 untruthful information and/or omissions of material fact that they made and/or caused
11 to be made, the Individual Defendants were unjustly enriched by at least \$50.4
12 million at the expense of, and to the detriment of, the Company, as detailed *supra*.

13 291. The Individual Defendants either benefitted financially from the
14 improper conduct, or received bonuses, stock options, or similar compensation from
15 the Company that was tied to the performance of the Company or its stock price or
16 received compensation or other payments that were unjust in light of the Individual
17 Defendants' bad faith conduct.

18 292. Plaintiff, as a shareholder and representative of the Company seeks
19 restitution from Defendants and seek an order from this Court disgorging all profits,
20 including from insider transactions, the redemption of preferred stock, benefits, and
21 other compensation, including any performance-based or valuation-based
22 compensation, obtained by the Individual Defendants due to their wrongful conduct
23 and breach of their fiduciary and contractual duties.

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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

**(Against Defendants Lau, Seu, Hazelton, and Ito For Contribution Under
Sections 10(b) and 21D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)**

293. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein.

294. The Company, along with Defendants Lau, Seu, Hazelton, and Ito, are named as defendants in the Securities Class Action, which asserts claims under the federal securities laws for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

295. The Securities Class Action alleges that the class members relied, directly or indirectly, upon the false and misleading statements and omissions, as alleged herein, in purchasing the Company securities. The Securities Class Action further alleges that, as a direct and proximate result, the class members suffered damages because the value of their investments were artificially inflated by the false and misleading statements and omissions, they purchased such securities at the artificially inflated prices, and the value of their investments fell when the truth was eventually revealed, causing economic losses to the class members.

296. If and when the Company is found liable in the Securities Class Action for these violations of the federal securities laws, the Company's liability will be in whole or in part due to the Defendants Lau, Seu, Hazelton, and Ito's willful and/or reckless violations of their obligations as officers and/or directors of the Company.

297. Defendants Lau, Seu, Hazelton, and Ito, because of their positions of control and authority as senior executive officers of the Company, were able to and did, directly and/or indirectly, exercise control over the business and corporate affairs of the Company, including the wrongful acts complained of herein and in the Securities Class Action.

298. Accordingly, Lau, Seu, Hazelton, and Ito are liable under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), which creates a private right of action for contribution, and Section 21D of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f), which governs the application of a private right of action for contribution arising out of violations of the Exchange Act.

299. As such, the Company is entitled to receive all appropriate contribution or indemnification from Defendants Lau, Seu, Hazelton, and Ito.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against the Proxy Defendants for Violations of

Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)

300. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein.

301. Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1), provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, by use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 12 of this title [15 U.S.C. § 78l].”

302. Rule 14a-9, promulgated pursuant to § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, provides that no proxy statement shall contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9.

303. Under the direction and watch of Defendants Connors, Dahl, Fargo, Flores, Fowler, Kane, Kennedy, Otani, Kennedy, Powell, Zlotnicka, Russell, Scilacci, and Seu (together, the “Proxy Defendants”), each of the 2019, 2020, 2021,

1 2022, and 2023 Proxy Statements (together, the “Proxy Statements”) failed to
2 disclose that: (i) Hawaiian Electric’s wildfire prevention and safety protocols and
3 procedures were inadequate to meet the challenges for which they were ostensibly
4 designed; (ii) accordingly, despite knowing the degree of risk that wildfires posed to
5 Maui, the Company’s inadequate safety protocols and procedures placed Maui at a
6 heightened risk of devastating wildfires; (iii) the fact that the Company did not
7 maintain its equipment and in fact had old, decaying equipment that went without
8 necessary maintenance; and (iv) as a result, the Company’s public statements were
9 materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

10 304. The Proxy Defendants also caused the Proxy Statements to be false
11 and misleading with regard to executive compensation in that they purported to
12 employ “pay-for-performance” elements, while failing to disclose that the
13 Company’s financial prospects were misrepresented as a result of false and
14 misleading statements, causing the Company’s share price to be artificially inflated
15 and allowing the Individual Defendants to wrongfully benefit from the fraud alleged
16 herein.

17 305. Moreover, the Proxy Statements were false and misleading when they
18 discussed the Company’s adherence to specific governance policies and procedures,
19 including the Code of Conduct, due to the Individual Defendants’ failures to abide by
20 them and their causing the Company to engage in improper accounting practices and
21 issue false and misleading statements and/or omissions of material fact.

22 306. In the exercise of reasonable care, the Proxy Defendants should have
23 known that by misrepresenting or failing to disclose the foregoing material facts, the
24 statements contained in the Proxy Statements were materially false and misleading.
25 The misrepresentations and omissions were material to Plaintiff in voting on the
26 matters set forth for shareholder determination in the Proxy Statements, including but
27 not limited to, election of directors and approval of executive compensation.

1 307. The misrepresentations and omissions set forth herein were material
2 to shareholders in voting on the proposals in the Proxy Statements who would not
3 have approved, *inter alia*: (i) the election of Defendants Connors, Dahl, Fargo,
4 Flores, Fowler, Kane, Kennedy, Otani, Scilacci, Russell, Zlotnicka, Lau, and Seu to
5 the Board; (ii) approval of the extension of the term of the Company's Nonemployee
6 Director stock plan and increase the shares available for issuance thereunder; and (iii)
7 the compensation of the Company's executive officers.

8 308. As a result of the respective Proxy Defendants causing the 2019
9 Proxy Statement to be false and misleading, Company shareholders approved the
10 proposals set forth therein, including, *inter alia*: (i) the re-election of Defendants
11 Connors, Fargo, and Scilacci to the Board of Directors; (ii) approval of the extension
12 of the term of the Company's Nonemployee Director stock plan and increase the
13 shares available for issuance thereunder; and (iii) approving executive compensation.

14 309. As a result of the respective Proxy Defendants causing the 2020
15 Proxy Statement to be false and misleading, Company shareholders approved the
16 proposals set forth therein, including, *inter alia*: (i) the election of Defendants
17 Fowler, Russell, Zlotnicka, and Kane to the Board of Directors; and (ii) approving
18 executive compensation.

19 310. As a result of the respective Proxy Defendants causing the 2021
20 Proxy Statement to be false and misleading, Company shareholders approved the
21 proposals set forth therein, including, *inter alia*: (i) the election of Defendants Dahl,
22 Kane, and Lau to the Board of Directors; and (ii) approving executive compensation.

23 311. As a result of the respective Proxy Defendants causing the 2022
24 Proxy Statement to be false and misleading, Company shareholders approved the
25 proposals set forth therein, including, *inter alia*: (i) the election of Defendants
26 Connors, Dahl, Fargo, Flores, Kane, Scilacci, and Seu to the Board of Directors; and
27 (ii) approving executive compensation.

1 G. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and
2 proper.

3 Dated: December 26, 2023

4 Respectfully submitted,

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